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Preface: 100 Years of Heidegger
Today, scholars and students alike are now enjoying the novel privilege of having access
to the final volumes published of the Gesamstausgabe, with all but a few available in English –
to say nothing of the many other languages into which the original German was translated.
However, alongside this, we must also acknowledge another feature of Heidegger’s works
present in our time. For, indeed, the first text used thematically in this project, Grundprobleme
der Phänomenologie (GA 58), consists of a lecture presented by Heidegger precisely one
hundred years ago. Thus, we are called to reflect on the impact of this thinker and the weight of
his contributions that inform our understanding about philosophy and human being as they begin
to reach their centenary status.
It is therefore essential to then acknowledge the vast amount of academic work that has
amassed over the last century, as it provides invaluable insight into Heidegger’s thought at every
level of understanding. It is from these resources that a work such as this is made possible. Thus,
it is my hope that as each coming year celebrates the centennial presentation or publication of
Heidegger’s works, the thought and discourse fostered by this remarkable thinker, in fulfillment
of his ever-imparted call for another new beginning of philosophy, will continue on for another
hundred years in study and research. I offer this work in such celebration.
In a final word, as I am in tremendous debt to these scholars who have presented their
work, and in doing so made this project possible, I owe this immediately to all of my professors
and to the members of my committee. It is to you all that I hold the most profound gratitude for
your care throughout my many years of study, and I further offer this work as a small token of
my appreciation in admiration and friendship.
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Abstract
In this work, I show Martin Heidegger’s development of the phenomenological method
from 1919 to 1929 as his main approach to all philosophical inquiry. In Chapter 1:
Phenomenology as the Hermeneutics of Factical Life, I first show how Heidegger begins his
philosophical career in 1919 with lectures that describe phenomenology as an ‘original science’
that seeks to study the structural character of life in itself. Through the four sub-sections of
Chapter 1, I show how Heidegger continues to formulate distinct stages of phenomenological
methodology through these early lectures that aid in his task to continue the explication of life
through the specific character of facticity. In this manner, the phenomenological method appears
in these early lectures of the 1920’s to progress from the original science of life in itself to what
Heidegger calls the hermeneutics of facticity – a critical method of interpretation aimed at
exposing the structures of facticity as the being of life and the being of human Dasein. Here, I
likewise show how Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology changes through these
lectures, providing radically new shifts and insights to his approach to philosophy that uncover
the ontological task of phenomenology.
Following these lectures, I then show in what sense Heidegger’s understanding of
phenomenology becomes properly thematized in its ontological import in Chapter 2:
Phenomenology as the Method of Ontology. Here, I begin with the 1927 publication of
Heidegger’s masterwork Sein und Zeit where the question of the meaning of being and the being
of Dasein become critical matters of phenomenological investigation. It is here that I show in
what sense Sein und Zeit marks a new stage in Heidegger’s phenomenological thinking as
developed through his previous lectures. In this manner, through the four sub-sections of Chapter
2, I likewise show how Heidegger proceeds from the analysis of the being of Dasein to the
vi

problematization of a purely ontological thinking of being itself through various lectures
following Sein und Zeit. Here, through a radicalization of metaphysics as the study ‘beyond
beings,’ Heidegger provides a new understanding of phenomenology as the path to the thinking
of being in its pure possibility.
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Introduction
The works of German philosopher Martin Heidegger have long been regarded as critical
contributions to the history of philosophy. However, upon first encountering Heidegger, one may
be in search of insights into being and the nature of human existence, and thus seek an
understanding of ‘his philosophy’ as a traditional collection of ideas, or in an even more
dangerous capacity, as answers. However, as I will show in this work, and in a manner I contend
to be in support of Heidegger’s own intentions, what remains at stake is not to approach
Heidegger in this regard as just any thinker who seems to proffer wisdom. Rather, Heidegger’s
work is consistently in service of a formulation of ‘how’ to think – the development of an
approach to all philosophy – that is, the rigorous and powerful method of phenomenology.
Indeed, as his philosophical career began giving lectures on phenomenology under its
founder, Edmund Husserl, Heidegger appears to immediately task himself with understanding
the method and aim of phenomenology as his approach to encountering all philosophical matters.
Thus, from his first lecture concerning the basic problems of phenomenology in 1919 until his
inaugural lecture address upon gaining the retired Husserl’s professorship in 1929, each lecture
and publication provides a new, radical revision of the method of phenomenology expressed
through remarkable demonstrations that grasp philosophical matters with a new understanding –
matters ranging from life experience, to history, to human existence, and indeed to nothing at all.
To provide an understanding of the essential relation to phenomenology that exists in
Heidegger’s thought, I will here present my research tracking Heidegger’s understanding and
development of the phenomenological method through its various manifestations as it appears
from 1919 to 1929. Through this, the role of phenomenology to Heidegger’s thought shall be
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made precisely clear, as it provides the possibility for the thought behind his most famous works
on the meaning of being and of human existence through Dasein. To accomplish this, I will
present my research in two chapters, each with four sub-sections. My presentation will proceed
in the following manner:
In Chapter 1: Phenomenology as the Hermeneutics of Factical Life, I will present
Heidegger’s initial understanding of phenomenology as the ‘original science of factical life’ and
its development through his early lectures on its way to a method of ontological analysis. Here, I
will show how Heidegger’s early lectures provide a critical stage of progression for
phenomenology as he attends to four essential stages of method: description, destruction,
reduction, and interpretation or hermeneutics. To express these matters, I will present
Heidegger’s formulation of the phenomenological method in the following four sub-sections.
In “Description and ‘Taking-Notice,’” I will discuss phenomenological description as it
appears in the 1919/20 Winter semester lecture, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 58).
Here, I will show that phenomenological description is understood as a ‘taking-notice’ of life
experience to explicate the phenomenon of life in itself – a transition from individual first-person
life experience to the character of life as such as it presents itself through experience. In
“Destruction and Formal Indication,” I will discuss phenomenological destruction and formal
indication as it appears in the 1920 Summer semester lecture Phänomenologie der Anschauung
und des Ausdrucks (GA 59) and the 1920/21 Winter, 1921 Summer semester lectures in
Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (GA 60). Here, I will show that phenomenological
destruction is first understood as the address of historical tradition that enables philosophy to
start afresh and begin its original work unclouded by the answers already provided by the history
of philosophy. Following this, I will show that phenomenological destruction is secondly
2

understood as a four-step process whereby a concept is isolated and its original meaning, given
only partially at first, is then brought-out so that it can be understood in a new light. For this, I
will show to what end formal indication appears as a pre-stage of phenomenological destruction
as a mode of understanding a phenomenon provisionally by its relational aspects in experience.
In “Hermeneutics,” I will discuss hermeneutic interpretation as it appears in the 1921/22
Winter semester lecture Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die
Phänomenologische Forschung (GA 61) and the 1922 Summer semester lecture Ontologie –
Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 63). Here, I will show that hermeneutics is a type of
phenomenological interpretation that seeks to investigate the meaning of phenomena as it
presents itself in some encounter, and from which its being can be exposed and understood.
Further, I will show how this provides Heidegger with a prime access to the being of human
being through Dasein, cementing phenomenology as a method of ontology. Lastly, in
“Phenomenology as Such,” I will discuss the appearance of phenomenology in the 1923/24
Winter semester lecture Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (GA 17) and the 1925
Summer semester lecture Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20). Here, I will
show Heidegger’s new understanding of phenomenology as expressed through the Ancient
Greek concepts of ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ, signifying a specific mode of encountering entities
that clears a path through which their being can be revealed. Further, I will express how this new
understanding of phenomenology provides Heidegger with a path of access to ontology.
In Chapter 2: Phenomenology as the Method of Ontology, I will show how Heidegger
arrives at a thinking of ontology through phenomenology, and further, as phenomenology
provides him with a greater understanding of ontology through a rethinking of metaphysics.
Here, I will show how phenomenology appears in Heidegger’s famous 1927 publication Sein und
3

Zeit (GA 2) as the method of investigation and interpretation from which the meaning of being
can be accessed through an analysis of the being of Dasein. Following this text, I will then show
how Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology as the method of ontology progresses to open
a path to the thinking of being in its pure possibility, or ‘beyond beings’ as expressed by
metaphysics. To accomplish this, I will present Heidegger’s formulation of the
phenomenological method of ontology in four sub-sections.
In “Investigation and Interpretation,” I will discuss phenomenological investigation and
interpretation as it appears in the 1927 publication Sein und Zeit (GA 2). Here, I will show that
phenomenological investigation and interpretation is the way in which an entity is disclosed in
some manner of appearance and thus revealed in some manner of being. Further, as it relates to
Dasein, the entity in question for an access to being itself, I will show in what sense Dasein is the
subject of phenomenological investigation and interpretation as Heidegger conducts an analysis
of its everyday mode of appearance, being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein] and subsequently
interpreted with regards to the primordial phenomena of care [Sorge] and time [Zeit] which allow
its being to become manifest. In “Reduction, Construction, Destruction,” I will discuss
phenomenological reduction, construction, and destruction as it appears in the 1927 Summer
semester lecture Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24). Here, I will show in what
sense these constitute Heidegger’s new methodological formulation of phenomenology as the
path to ontology. I will further show specifically in what sense each stage of the method –
reduction, construction, and destruction, respectively – operate in leading away from the
appearance of an individual being and towards being itself.
In “Interpretations of Kant,” I will discuss Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation
of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as it appears in the 1927/28 Winter semester lecture
4

Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA 25). Here, I will
provide Heidegger’s understanding of the aims of phenomenological interpretation, similar to its
manifestation in GA 2. Alongside this, I will present Heidegger’s interpretation of the Critique,
through which he arrives at a new understanding of phenomenology and its task of the thinking
of being in its pure possibility through metaphysics. Lastly, in “Metaphysics,” I will discuss
Heidegger’s further development of the phenomenological method towards metaphysics as it
appears in the 1929 Spring inaugural lecture Was ist Metaphysik? (GA 9). Here, I will present
Heidegger’s understanding of the essential role of the nothing [das Nichts] with respect to the
possibility of any ontological thinking. From this, I will show to what extent the nothing informs
Heidegger’s new understanding of metaphysics through the phenomenality of the nothing in its
self-unfolding character.
Prior to the presentation of this research, it is worth putting forth a word on the scope of
this work. It is apparent both from the objectives of the work and from the depth of the subject
matter that this project could no doubt appear in a work of doubled length or more on the texts
included herein alone. For, overall, the aim of this project – to show Heidegger’s development of
the phenomenological method and its essential role in his approach to philosophy – is one which
can and indeed needs be further applied to the rest of the materials within the Gesamstausgabe,
as it is clearly present throughout his career up to the very end. 1 To complete this fully is
nothing short of an impossible task that one can only hope to achieve in part throughout careful
attention and rigorous work in the course of a single lifetime. For it indeed concerns the entire
life’s work of one man and indeed, as I contend, his work on a single mode of thinking.

1

See Martin Heidegger, “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie,” in Zur Sache des Denkens, (Tübingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1969), 91-102, “My Way to Phenomenology,” in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New
York: Harper & Row, 1972), 74-82, hereafter referenced as GA 14.
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The intense absorption and investment that was required to effectively read these texts
has foremost been the greatest challenge and indeed the greatest reward of this project, as
through both my own enchantment and Heidegger’s unique modes of presentation I have battled
constantly to remain in control of the subject matter. Yet, what has appeared as a result of this
engagement I feel is both accurate and honorific of the original content, presented with the
deepest respect and admiration. Thus, it has been my most honest attempt to provide the essential
material to illustrate the progression of Heidegger’s thinking as it moves through
phenomenology, and the dynamism of the phenomenological method itself, beginning with the
early lectures of his career and continuing on to breach his most famous published work Sein und
Zeit and beyond. To this end, I have at every chance indicated as many possible references for
further discussion and provided sufficient explanations when necessary within my footnotes,
cited in German/English pagination. For indeed, it appears as Heidegger’s foremost task to
present the possibilities of a special way of thinking – to understand the phenomenological
method as a mode of encountering, as opposed to systems of “levers and switchgears…,” 2 and to
invite the occasion of this unique encounter of thought to become more persistent.

2

Martin Heidegger, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993), 22,
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Scott Campbell, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 16, hereafter referenced
as GA 58.
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Chapter 1: Phenomenology as The Hermeneutics of Factical Life
My task in this chapter is to illustrate Heidegger’s beginnings as a phenomenological
thinker, guided by his first formulations of phenomenology as a method to philosophy. By
examining key texts from early in Heidegger’s career, it will be made clear in what manner
phenomenology as a method provides Heidegger with an access to the subject matter of
philosophy, which Heidegger first delineates as ‘the original science of factical life in itself
[Ursprungswissenschaft vom Leben an sich].’3 As such, phenomenology is presented as a
radically new philosophical study of life in itself, one that aims to expose the essential structures
of factical life through phenomenological investigations of life experience. Through each text,
Heidegger presents the growing method of phenomenology each time in a more robust fashion
than the last as his careful attention to the method itself produces more precise phenomenological
demonstrations. For Heidegger, these explications of factical life in itself begin to indicate the
potential for phenomenology as a method of philosophical thinking to provide a direct access to
life in its very being through a hermeneutic of the facticity [Faktizität] of factical life [faktischen
Lebens] – the phenomenological exemplar for explicating the lived experience of human
existence.4 These initial indications towards phenomenology as a path to ontological thinking
appear as early as 1919/20 in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 58) and indeed serve as
a horizon for phenomenological philosophy that emerges out of factical life in itself. 5 In this
manner, through phenomenology Heidegger begins to articulate a philosophical study of the

3

GA 58: 65/51, (my brackets).

4

For further discussion on facticity, see François Raffoul, “Factical Life and the Need for Philosophy,” in
Rethinking Facticity, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson, (Albany: SUNY, 2008), 69-85.
5

GA 58: 148/114, 156/120.
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“being of life”6 and ultimately the being of human existence as the “being-there of Dasein”7
through ontology.
Phenomenology thus receives its merit as a radically new method of philosophical
thinking in its original access to the phenomenological and ontological structures of life.
However, as Heidegger indicates in GA 58: “the most burning, most original, and ultimate basic
problem of phenomenology…is it itself for itself.”8 Thus, before phenomenology can begin its
positive work, it must first take itself up in an address of its own history. To this extent, in each
work presented in this project Heidegger expresses emphatic impressions on the task of
phenomenology and philosophy to gain such genuine and original insight into philosophical
questioning that first articulates and rethinks the tradition of philosophy as the historical
progression of thought. At the same time, and in various degrees, the progression of these
introductions for the most part follows a concrete presentation of the historical context
surrounding the subject-matter of the lecture, accompanied by Heidegger’s direct indication of
the faults of the tradition in the misunderstanding and mistreatment of philosophical problems

6

Martin Heidegger, Phanomenologie des religiösen Lebens, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), 241,
Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2010), 181, hereafter referenced as GA 60.
7

Martin Heidegger, Ontologie - Hermeneutik der Faktizität (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988), 29,
Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. John van Buren (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999),
24, hereafter referenced as GA 63. The term Dasein, literally translated as ‘there-being,’ emerges in Heidegger’s
work from its traditional German usage as a neutral word to express existence and its related phenomenological
usage to indicate an intentional position from which lived experience is had. As the texts progress, Heidegger begins
to thematize Dasein as a proper entity, one which becomes his favored term to express the human being in its mode
of existence. Dasein is thus, even in its ontological formulation, at all ends a term that describes a basic
phenomenological situation of human lived experience.
8

GA 58: 1/2.
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spanning back to the Ancient Greeks. In this manner, as Heidegger writes: “There is no iurare in
verba magistri [swearing to the words of a master]”9 in phenomenological philosophy.
Indeed, as it serves phenomenology as a method to philosophy, this ‘destruction’
[Destruktion] of the tradition of philosophy remains an essential starting point for Heidegger into
the 1920’s as it provides a historical context of ideas through which the original questions of
philosophy may be rescued by phenomenology. 10 And indeed, as the phenomenological method
becomes Heidegger’s path to ontology, as it will be shown in the next chapter, destruction
remains a critical concept for the critique of the history of philosophy that is proper to a new
encounter with being and human being through Dasein. With respect to this matter of access to
philosophical problems from the tradition, Heidegger even takes the situation of the university
itself as a facet of the historical context of thinking. In this manner, philosophy as the pursuit of
the history of philosophy, alongside what Heidegger calls ‘university-philosophy,’ is thus
distinguished from genuine and original philosophizing. 11 In a word, Heidegger brings this
matter to the fore by asking: “[Can] a philosophizing still be genuine and original if it entrusts
the situation of its basic experience to an accidental institution that arose historically and has

9

GA 58: 6/5.

10

A list of historical destructions in each text featured here is as follows: GA 58: History of Phenomenology and
Philosophy, 1-24/1-17; GA 59: Problem of History, 60-86/46-69, Problem of Lived Experience e.g. Natorp, 92148/73-114, e.g. Dilthey, 149-174/128-142; GA 60: Philosophy of Religion e.g. Ernst Troelsch, 19-26/14-19,
Interpretations of Augustine, 159-164/115-119; GA 61: Reception of Aristotle, 4-9/5-10, Method of Philosophy, 1126/11-22; GA 63: Traditional Concept of Hermeneutics, 8-14/6-10, History of Phenomenology, 67-77/53-60,
Traditional Concept of Man, 21-29/17-24, Misunderstandings of Subject-Object Relation, 81-83/62-64; GA 17:
Consciousness and Being e.g. Husserl, 41-107/32-77, 269-290/208-221, Consciousness and Being e.g. Descartes,
108-269/79-207. GA 20: Philosophy as Scientific Philosophy e.g. Brentano and Husserl, 22-33/18-26, Major
Breakthroughs in Phenomenology, 43-103/27-75, Historical Development of Phenomenology e.g. Aristotle and
Husserl, 103-122/75-89, Method and Aims of Phenomenology e.g. Husserl, 123-202/90-150.
11

Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische
Forschung, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985), 46-49, 62-73 Phenomenological Interpretations of
Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2009), 36-37, 47-55, hereafter referenced as GA 61.
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perhaps now reached the end of its existence?” 12 The task of philosophy as a phenomenological
endeavor thus receives its most vital charge prior to any methodological demonstration - it must
begin self-critically if it is to begin at all with any certainty towards its access to life and to being
in an originary retrieval of thought.
Heidegger’s phenomenological path to philosophy as it is characterized by these early
texts exhibits a mode of thinking that is in constant change as it proceeds as directed from an
intimate encounter with the ‘things themselves.’ 13 Thus, from a deeply reflective approach to
philosophy, Heidegger achieves much through the phenomenology of factical life as it leads his
thinking towards ontological considerations on the being of Dasein – the being-there of human
being. To illustrate Heidegger’s progression of phenomenology from original science of factical
life to the hermeneutics of facticity, I will present the development of the phenomenological
method in the following way.
In “Description and ‘Taking-Notice,’” I will present the first formulation of the
phenomenological method as a mode of explicating life in itself through descriptions of factical
life experience as presented in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 58). In doing so, it
shall be made clear in what manner Heidegger’s early thought is understood as one that emerges
from life itself, and with an “attitude which is constantly checking and revising” 14 of
philosophical tradition, remains riveted to it. Following these matters, in “Destruction and
Formal Indication,” I shall present Heidegger’s critical path to securing original
12

GA 61: 68/52.

13

See GA 58: 24/17 for Heidegger’s use of “an den Sachen” in reference to Husserl’s famous phrase, “Wir wollen
auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen [We must go back to the things themselves].” Edmund Husserl, Logische
Unterschungen, (Max Niemeyer, 1913), Erste Teil, Zweiter Band, 6, “Logical Investigations,” trans. J. N. Findlay,
(New York: Routledge, 1982) Part 1, Vol 2, 168.
14

GA 58: 25/21.
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phenomenological access to philosophical problems veiled and distorted from the tradition as
presented in Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (GA 59) and Phänomenologie
des religiösen Lebens (GA 60). It will be shown from these texts in what manner ‘destruction’ is
to be understood as a method of phenomenology, alongside its relation to ‘formal indication,’
and its importance in these early stages of Heidegger’s thinking. Here, destruction first appears
through Heidegger’s critique of philosophical tradition, allowing an original encounter with the
origin of concepts to be made possible.
In “Hermeneutics,” I shall present the phenomenological method of hermeneutics as a
mode of critical interpretation that provides Heidegger an immediate path to the ontological
possibilities of the phenomenology of facticity as expressed in Phänomenologische
Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung (GA 61), and
Ontologie - Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 63). These two sections provide decisive
presentations of Heidegger’s development of the phenomenological method towards ontology
via analyses of the being of factical life through Dasein. Following these explicit presentations of
the phenomenological method, I shall then in “Phenomenology as Such” present Heidegger’s
formal considerations on phenomenology from Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung
(GA 17) and Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20) as it reaches a mature
definition with respect to this progression of method, leading further towards a clear engagement
with Dasein and the question of being (Seinsfrage) through phenomenology. In the end, these
matters will further serve to prepare for the following chapter, “Phenomenology as the Method
of Ontology.” Thus, it shall be revealed overall that the essential question of the being of Dasein,

11

as it characterizes Heidegger’s ontological thinking, is one that can only begin to be articulated,
let alone answered, through phenomenology and the hermeneutics of factical life. 15
Description and ‘Taking-Notice’
I begin then in the Winter semester of 1919/20 with Heidegger’s first major lecture
course on phenomenology, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 58). Here, Heidegger
presents his early considerations on the method of phenomenology as ‘the original science of
factical life’ – a mode of philosophical thinking that seeks to establish the study of life as the
origin of all philosophical problems. In this manner, by providing vivid descriptions of his
everyday, trivial activities and guiding the audience through a radical shift in outlook towards
such experiences, Heidegger articulates in what manner the method of phenomenology opens a
path of access to life through its manifestations in experience as life ‘in itself.’ 16 As Heidegger
writes: “We go along in the factical life-experiences and see if, in them and just in them, an
original articulation of life indicates itself.” 17 Thus, by his demonstrations of phenomenological
description in the ‘taking-notice’ [Kenntnisnahme] of life’s appearance through personal
experience, Heidegger further extracts the phenomenal character of life in itself by establishing
an absolute context of activities beyond any individual perspective. Phenomenology, in this early
formulation of method, hereby seeks to render the structures of life in itself apparent through a
descriptive recounting of one’s own experiences in factical life in such a manner as to render
from one’s personal life, life in itself – to use Heidegger’s terms, to render the ‘esoteric
15

For further discussion see John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1994.); Scott Campbell, Heidegger’s Early Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and
Language, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012.); Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest
Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, (Albany: SUNY, 1994).
16

See GA 58: 32-34/26-27 for further discussion on everydayness.

17

GA 58: 157/121.
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disposition’ of factical life as an ‘exoteric determination’ of life in itself through
phenomenological description.18 Thus, from a “critical destruction of this [self-world]” 19 the
phenomenon of life in itself can appear and be explicated through an overall ‘reduction’ of its
essential phenomenal structure.20
Continuing to express the role of phenomenological description for the task of an original
science of factical life, Heidegger explains: “Life – my life, your life, their life, our life…we
want to get to know in its most general typicality and, indeed, in such a way that we remain in it,
looking around in it in its way [in seiner Weise]….”21 From this comment, Heidegger thus begins
his explication of life in itself with an impression upon following and responding to life exactly
as it gives itself, a task achieved through phenomenological description. In this manner,
Heidegger directs us further: “We will look for ourselves at ‘life in itself’ and then see if we find
in it a particular character, one that matter-of-factly demands a clear-cut, conceptual, and
meaningful circumscription…which is both coming from the things themselves and is taken from
them…”22 Having presented this, the proper mode of access to life in itself, Heidegger then
proceeds to demonstrate phenomenological descriptions of everyday trivial activities in his own
life from out of which life in itself is to appear in its phenomenal character.

18

GA 58: 6/5.

19

GA 58: 139/107.

20

It is worth noting that Heidegger is attentive to the relation in the phenomenological method of reduction,
construction, destruction as early as 1919 (see GA 58: 121/95, 123/96, 147/113, 151/116) though it does not become
a thematic process of the method until 1927. See Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 26-32, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert
Hofstadter, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 18-23, hereafter referenced as GA 24.
21

GA 58: 30/25.

22

Ibid.
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For the first description, Heidegger begins with the experience of a visit – details of his
own life from which the reflection on experience can be grasped as such. His description is as
follows: “[Looking] at books together, viewing pictures, drinking tea, smoking cigarettes;
thereupon, taking a walk together; the weather brightens up, the sun comes through, the sun sets,
it is becoming brisk…”23 From this occasion, Heidegger impresses once more that what is
decisive for phenomenology is not the specific details themselves indicating his personal
activities, but rather that from these what is given overall is “a context of experience in which I
am fully engrossed.”24 Thus, these seeming trivialities become of extreme phenomenological
importance for the explication of life in itself, as the context of experience presents a path of
access to its phenomenal character. To thus access life in itself, the critical element of
phenomenological description must be employed. As Heidegger states, an essential change in
attitude takes place through phenomenological description which he terms ‘taking-notice’
[Kenntnisnahme], more commonly understood as perusal. In this manner, through the
recollection of events one is given access to the context of one’s life experiences in a thematic
way from which life in itself may be glimpsed. 25 Heidegger expresses this essential shift in
attitude through the character of ‘taking-notice’ in the following manner, itself a description: 26
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“In the evening I am asked: What did you do this afternoon? – and I recount the visit and the
stroll; or in the evening I contemplate it for myself, I let it drift past me, or I write down what
happened to me in my diary – overall: I take-notice of it by recounting, orally or in writing, or
contemplatively.”27 Thus, the factical experience itself does not change in content. Rather,
through recounting and indeed reliving the experiences as experiences of factical life, the attitude
towards such events is modified. The experiences themselves are exalted from disconnected
trivialities to events of factical life under a thematic context. 28
Turning towards the access of life in itself through the context of experience, Heidegger
thus proceeds with the following phenomenological description:
After the lecture I come out of the university building; over there I see an acquaintance
greeting me; I return the greeting; passing by the Colosseum I hear music; it occurs to me
that I want to go to the theater this evening, that I want to attend to this and that, that I
cannot come in too late; in the meantime it occurs to me that in a portion of the lecture, I
did not bring out the formulation in such a way that it adequately rendered what was
being examined; walking on, I live in that which I still want to attend to from beforehand;
in the course of this, I see people and go into a cigar store on the street corner, buy myself
Swiss stogies, listen to the gentleman behind the store-counter animatedly recount the last
football match; what he is recounting interests me, how he is recounting it does not; as I
pack up, I only see how he becomes more and more animated and excited about the
brilliant performance of a halfback.29
From this description, Heidegger seeks what is precisely at stake concerning the
phenomenological explication of life from the context of experience. Through the shift in attitude
towards the content of life through ‘taking-notice,’ an essential discovery of the ‘how’ of factical
Phenomenological Philosophy,” trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), 91-96, hereafter
referenced as Ideen.
27
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life become accessible. In this manner, as Heidegger writes: “The idea of phenomenology is: the
original science of life…What is to be researched, rather, is life as arising, as emerging out of an
origin.”30 Thus, the phenomenological method of description firstly grants an access to the
context of life’s content without the strict emphasis on one’s own personal relations. In this
manner, a ‘destruction’ [Destruktion] of personal context takes place from which the remaining
absolute context of life experience can undergo a reduction towards the character of life in itself.
As Heidegger writes: “[Life] as arising out of it can be deepened, which is ultimately possible
only in this way: that life is itself taken back into the origin in its whole facticity…The idea is of
such an absolute science of life, not of this or that factical, individual life.” 31
In explicating the phenomenon of life as it appears as the absolute context of life
experience as such, Heidegger returns to the previous description to amplify what is self-evident
of life in the experience. In response, he thus states: “You, he, she, we always live in a direction
[Richtung]…usually in such a way that we are not even explicitly aware of the direction. I can
explicitly place myself into it, but it can also come upon me or sneak up on me or simply be
there, yet in such a way that…a direction explicitly [ausdrücklich] engrosses us….”32 He
continues: “One has particular convictions [Überzeugungen] and ideas [Ideen] of and about that
which encounters me in life…One is thrown this way and that by oppositions
[Gegensätzen]…One gets wrapped up in something, is caught up [gefangen] in something (or ensnared) [be-fangen]…one is happy about life…[then] once again it’s agony.”33 These are not
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mere general statements, nor are they private reflections from Heidegger’s own intimate life
experience. Rather, as phenomenological descriptions, they are indications of the appearance of
life in itself in the ‘how’ of its manifestation. Thus, Heidegger delimits the phenomenal character
of life in itself: “[It] has a basic aspect, this life, which we will designate as its ‘self-sufficiency
[Selbstgenügsamkeit]….’”34 He continues: “Self-sufficient…its intentional structure [has] a basic
directedness in each case and always into a world…This ‘form’ is the mode of life’s own
direction, which it even takes right where it wants to fulfill and satisfy itself. Structurally, it does
not need to come out of itself….”35 Life, full of its own comings and goings, thus pulls us along
in it through this essential directedness as it needs nothing else to be itself.
Following this explication of the self-sufficiency of life in itself, another aspect of its
phenomenal structure becomes apparent. As Heidegger writes:
Thus, all kinds of things, which lie in the circle of each one of us, and in the circle that is
always going along with life streaming forth: our environing world [Umwelt] –
landscapes, regions, cities and coasts; our with-world [Mitwelt] – parents, siblings,
acquaintances, superiors, teachers, students, officials, strangers…our self-world
[Selbstwelt] …my personal rhythm.36
In this manner life’s self-sufficiency which comes into view through the phenomenological
method of ‘taking-notice’ through description, appearing from one’s own factical life experience
in a personal context of meaningfulness, is further manifest in its worldly character. It is thus not
only the sheer vitality of life’s directedness that draws our activities in its flow, such that we are
seldom aware of it ourselves, but the very character of the ‘in which’ that factical life occurs
means that what and wherein we are directed towards life are the manifold worlds of life in itself.
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As Heidegger writes: “Our life is our world, which we seldom see, but rather always…‘are by
it’: ‘captivated,’ ‘repelled,’ ‘enjoying,’ ‘renouncing.’ ‘We are always somehow encountering.’
Our life is the world…And our life is only lived as life insofar as it lives in a world.” 37
Thus, the critical matter of the phenomenology of factical life becomes apparent:
Through these investigations which have brought the self-sufficient and worldly characters of
life in itself into view through ‘taking-notice,’ the first formulation of the phenomenological
method has been presented in its expression and demonstration as phenomenological description.
In this manner, through an essential shift in attitude towards one’s own experiences, an absolute
context is laid open for further work upon extracting life in itself as a basic phenomenon. This
initial state of phenomenology is an essential point of departure for the following texts to be
presented as outgrowths of this basic position.
Though the thematic demonstration of phenomenological description shortly falls away,
the structural relations that lie as its ground remain in Heidegger’s phenomenological thinking as
an essential approach to philosophy and factical life. 38 Following the matters presented in this
text, Heidegger continues to develop the phenomenological method to expand the power of
phenomenological destruction briefly indicated here. 39 Indeed, following its appearance in GA
58, phenomenological destruction takes on a very specific meaning and method for Heidegger in
the lectures to follow, Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (GA 59) and
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Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (GA 60). Here, Heidegger presents individual stages of
phenomenological destruction through demonstrations to isolate phenomena and prepare the way
to an original encounter with them – beyond the initial dual-meaning of destruction whereby
phenomenology makes its ‘fresh start’ and the personal context of factical life experience is
destroyed to reach the phenomenon of life in itself.
Thus, in GA 59 Heidegger presents and demonstrates the four steps of phenomenological
destruction that overall aim at extracting the original problems of philosophy as they arise out of
factical life, and as such have been misshapen by the history of philosophy. In this manner, what
emerges from the process of phenomenological destruction is an original understanding of the
‘problem-situation’ for philosophy, one that point towards a new direction in thought – the
concrete historical Dasein in its factical existence. Following this, Heidegger then employs
phenomenological destruction as he approaches the task of radically rethinking the philosophy of
religion through phenomenological interpretations of religious experience detailed by Paul and
Augustine. Here, Heidegger appears to utilize the newly discovered method of destruction but
focuses his explicit remarks on the method of formal indication and its relation to
phenomenological destruction.
Despite its mention throughout GA 59,40 formal indication here receives explicit attention
as Heidegger expresses it as a precursor to destruction, one attends to the specific relational
element of phenomena to experience, what Heidegger calls the “‘how’ I stand with regard to
things….’”41 Here, one attends to a phenomenon as it is initially understood by a provisional
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fore-having or pre-understanding from which a primary access to the original content of
phenomena may be achieved.42 In this manner, through phenomenological destruction and
formal indication, the philosophy of religion provides an essential ground for the rethinking
philosophical tradition and the further explication of concrete historical Dasein through
phenomenological interpretations expressing fundamental characteristics of the being of factical
life, opening the way for further ontological explications.
Destruction and Formal Indication
In Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (GA 59), Heidegger introduces
destruction as a phenomenological method that arises out of a necessity for philosophy to free
itself from the constraints of history given by the philosophical tradition. Here, Heidegger
identifies that it is thus from lived experience itself, not from any historical situation, that
philosophy must make its way towards its original problematic ground. In this manner, as
Heidegger expresses, philosophy as phenomenology must thus think itself anew – and it is
precisely from this “wanting-to-become-free from an un-genuine, non-primordially appropriated
tradition”43 that destruction is employed. Methodologically, destruction is first understood and
employed as an address of history itself, as Heidegger indicates: “The past newly grows towards
every living present…The fundamental sense of intellectual history…is pre-delineated
[vorgezeichnet] by the living preconception that leads and guides all understanding.” 44 Thus, in
order that phenomenological philosophy begin as a rethinking of traditional philosophy, and
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remain a study of ‘basic problems,’ this methodological destruction of history must be properly
expressed and demonstrated.
It is thus from this initial historical destruction that the second aspect of destruction is
then employed – the four-stage isolation and pursuit of an original encounter with phenomena.
To accomplish this, Heidegger first addresses the positive sense of destruction as a revelatory
method of phenomenology regarding history:
Phenomenological destruction – as a fundamental part of phenomenological
philosophizing – is therefore not without direction; it does not fortuitously take up
meanings of words in order to explain them by means of other taken up meanings. It is
not mere shattering but a ‘directed’ destruction [Abbau]. It leads into the situation of the
pursuit of the pre-delineations, of the enactment of the preconception and thereby of the
fundamental experience.45
As directed by such destruction, Heidegger proceeds with the phenomenological task of
addressing the problem situation of philosophy exemplified by problems of the a priori and life
experience – from which the phenomenological destruction will be conducted through the
respectively designated phenomena of history and factical life experience. Through a destruction
of these two problems, Heidegger thus seeks to identify the issues within the tradition of
philosophy that hinder a phenomenological thinking of factical life and bar a proper and original
access to the understanding of lived experience as a source for philosophical questioning. In the
initiation of this task, Heidegger presents the four stages of phenomenological destruction in the
following way: “1. initial specification of the ambiguity, 2. first bringing-out, 3. pursuit of the
pre-delineations, 4. understanding of the preconception.” 46
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To address the first problem of the a priori, Heidegger begins a phenomenological
destruction of the phenomenon of history. In the demonstration of the destruction, Heidegger
carries out each step as previously listed in a rigorous manner. He thus begins with the first step,
the initial ‘specification of ambiguity,’ by presenting six different meanings of history,
“meanings that all, however, point back to a unitary sense-complex….” 47 In this manner,
Heidegger enumerates various significations that appear in the word-concept ‘history’ with the
intention of following their direction towards an original meaning. However, as he remarks on
the method: “One may be tempted to search for the common – that is, for what history means in
general…One sees immediately that it does not work like this. One is automatically led to ask
from where those different meanings each time attain their sense and where the primordial sense
lies…that is, the ‘origin’ from which they grow.” 48
With this in mind, Heidegger presents the following phrases: “I. When I say: ‘My friend
studies history…’ II. Someone…is given the advice: ‘Just orient yourself a bit in the history!...’
III. One speaks of ‘history-less…’ [having] no history…’ IV. Again…as life’s great
instructor…V. One means something else when one says…“This person has a sad history…’
VI… ‘A very unpleasant story [Geschichte]….’49 Following this, as the mere specification of
ambiguity is not enough, Heidegger then moves on to the second stage of the destruction as the
‘first bringing-out of the pre-delineations’ still contained “within the ambit of the understanding
in factical life experience….”50 From these ambiguities, Heidegger presents the following pre-
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delineations of history as: 1. The science of history, 2. A field of facts, 3. Tradition, 4. The
instructor of life, 5. Personal historical past of factical life, 6. An incident which concerns me. 51
The task of the destruction now turns towards the third stage, ‘pursuing the predelineations’ towards the explication of the overall sense-complex. At this stage, the predelineations appear more sharply defined, in part through the phenomenal explication of ‘having’
with respect to history. The six pre-delineations are presented by Heidegger as follows:
1. History as theoretical attitudinal complex, as a concretizing logic of a domain of
subject matter. 2. History as that which is past…a whole of being as something that has
become… 3. History as one’s own past in the correlate of the preserving and constantly
self-renewing taking-along: tradition, 4. History as past which is not one’s own…selfworldly directed tendencies of Dasein in the correlate of the being-familiar that takes
guidance from itself. 5. History as ownmost past in the correlate of ‘having’ that is
motivated in only self-worldly directed tendencies. 6. History as occurring in the event
character [Ereignischarakter] of factical life related to factical self-world, with-world and
environing world.52
As these significations are directed towards an essential unitary sense-complex, the process of
phenomenological destruction must then turn towards an articulation of these significations
towards an original preconception by way of relation. In this manner, Heidegger, then searches
through the relations expressed by each sense-complex indicated in the pre-delineations of
history for one relation which provides the grounds for a deeper phenomenological
characterization. Heidegger thus determines this essential relation as that of ‘enactment,’ as the
relations of history are understood “by the manner in which it is had, is experienced.”53 In this
manner, the six detailed pre-delineations are assessed according to the criteria set forth by the
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characterization of enactment for the destruction to proceed towards the phenomenological
origin correlating to ‘self-worldly Dasein.’ 54
Heidegger thus presents the mark of criteria as follows: “An enactment is primordial
if…it requires…an always actual renewal in a self-worldly Dasein. It does so precisely in such a
way that this renewal and the ‘necessity’…of renewal inherent in it co-constitutes this selfworldly existence.”55 What is at stake here is the indication of a pre-delineation of history which
expresses an original preconception from the sense-complex, and at the same time presents itself
as co-constitutive of Dasein itself – meaning, that in the experience of Dasein in its factical life,
the enactment provides an experience of Dasein’s selfhood as something it ‘has.’ Thus,
Heidegger reviews the sense-complexes indicated by the significations of history and discovers
this exact character of ‘having’ that satisfies the criteria of enactment. In addressing the fifth
sense-complex of history as ownmost past Heidegger expresses the following:
In case V. there is a sense of enactment that comes even closer to the primordial, so that
here past is had as the ownmost one and this having, in fact, enacts itself in such a way
that the ownmost past also loses the environing worldly character into which the selfworldly instances of meaningfulness constantly fall back. 56
Here, destruction appears yet again in terms of rendering an individual experience-context into
an explicit experience-context as such, 57 however it is here expressed through the explication of
enactment: “Case V. is situated closest to the primordial – and is still not the primordial itself –
pure self-worldly meaningfulness.”58 In this sense, the idea of an absolute context, a pure self-
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worldly meaningfulness appears again as the original access to life phenomenologically. Yet, the
sense of enactment given here clearly reaches the character sought in the destruction, as
Heidegger writes: “The enactment is in each case and necessarily such that what has been selfworldly meaningful arises again in it…I seize my own past so that again and again it is had for
the first time and that I myself am always affected anew by myself and ‘am’ in renewed
enactment.”59
The method of phenomenological destruction is thus a clear path of revision and
indication to address the intimations given by a pre-understanding that traditional philosophy
encapsulates in a veil of historical progression. As it concerns the destruction of the concept of
history at hand, it thus reaches its end through this indication of the primordiality of the sensecomplex given by the pre-delineation of history as enacted in the ownmost past of historical
Dasein. As these considerations bring Heidegger’s task further along in explicating the original
preconception, we are indeed as Heidegger indicates ‘on the way’ to a phenomenological
reduction which takes as its goal primordiality. In this manner, the phenomenological destruction
of history has provided access into the primordial ground of the problem itself, which Heidegger
articulates as “the human being in its concrete, individual historical Dasein.” 60 In this manner,
Heidegger’s demonstration of the method of deconstruction provides another concrete step in the
progression of phenomenology, one that remains motivated by a basic tendency of rethinking
philosophy out of its muddled history as it emerges out of life itself and establishing a method
through which phenomena themselves can be recovered and revealed. As it concerns the positive
destruction in this text, Heidegger indeed continues on to address the problem of lived
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experience through destructions of Natorp and Dilthey in their life-philosophies to explicate the
essential problem of experience in factical life. Through these two destructions, Heidegger
continues to delimit the essential problematic of Dasein, as he finds in the two philosophers that
“[actual] Dasein does not come to its primordial due. [It] does not become a possible problem.” 61
Following this indication, Heidegger imparts that it is the task of philosophy, through
phenomenology, to thus maintain its hold and its view on factical Dasein in its concreteness to
prepare the way for a proper understanding of both the phenomenon of history and the historical
character of each Dasein. In a flourish, Heidegger thus proclaims: “Philosophy is pervaded by a
fundamental experience and must form itself in it in terms of content. Therefore there are no
philosophical disciplines (such as logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion).” 62 Rather,
factical experience as the subject-matter of philosophy necessitates that concrete Dasein in its
factical experience be taken phenomenologically as the primary charge. At the end of GA 59,
Heidegger presents a last word on philosophy and phenomenology to reinforce this essential
progression towards factical experience which explicates Dasein above all. “Philosophy has the
task of preserving the facticity of life and strengthening the facticity of Dasein. Philosophy as
factical life experience requires a motive in which the worry about factical life experience itself
remains. We call this philosophical fundamental experience [Grunderfahrung].”63 As Heidegger
thus expresses the state of philosophy in its relation to life itself, he once more impresses that the
essential path of access to this entire philosophical domain is at all ends possible only insofar as
philosophy proceeds phenomenologically. He writes: “It is the task of phenomenology to put
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itself into that tendency towards the actual primordial Dasein and to always from anew throw the
torch into…philosophy.”64
Heidegger directly carries over the task of phenomenological destruction and the
essential problem of explicating the facticity of Dasein in Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens
(GA 60). As the texts is comprised of two major parts, 65 the 1920/21 Winter semester lecture
“Introduction to Philosophy of Religion” and the 1921 Summer semester lecture “Augustine and
Neo-Platonism,” Heidegger’s aims are readily apparent in its two basic manifestations. In
“Introduction to Philosophy of Religion,” Heidegger seeks to open a new path to theological
understanding outside of traditional philosophy of religion through phenomenological
interpretations of Paul’s letters to the Galatians and Thessalonians. 66 Here, the essence of
phenomenological interpretation is to understand the texts in question as expressions of factical
experience from which life itself can be explicated. In looking to Paul for phenomenological
explications of factical life with respect to history, Heidegger also seeks to indeed begin on a
phenomenologically-oriented context, as Paul “has come to Christianity not through a historical
tradition, but through an original experience.” 67 In this manner, Heidegger continues to be guided
by phenomenological destruction as he isolates key phenomena relevant to the lived experience
of Paul’s relation to whom he is engaging in proclamation. To accomplish this, Heidegger
presents the method of formal indication – a preliminary expression of the relations of
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significance in a concept that is heavily tied to destruction. Thus, through phenomenological
destruction and formal indication, Heidegger begins to extract essential characteristics of factical
life through the experiences of Paul that provide articulations for the factical situation of life in
terms of being [Sein], providing a critical basis for his following interpretations of factical life in
its own being through Augustine.
The progression of phenomenological destruction to GA 60 is apparent in the very
introduction of the work as Heidegger remarks on the necessity to understand the three essential
concepts at work in the lecture, “‘introduction,’ ‘phenomenology,’…and ‘religion.’” 68 The path
to understanding these, Heidegger writes, will be accessed through phenomenological
destruction: “We will begin with the clarification of the meaning of words, but we will refer
immediately to the connections among objects indicated in these meanings such that these
connections will be put into question.”69 Although Heidegger does not continue to demonstrate a
destruction of the concepts themselves to the same degree as in GA 59, he nevertheless indicates
the route towards this understanding. Taking the concept of ‘introduction’ as his theme,
Heidegger thus presents an initial destruction through the indication of ambiguities. He thus lists
the significations of ‘introduction’ as: “a) the delimitation of the material domain…b) the
doctrine of the methodological treatment of the material domain…determination (Feststellung)
of the concept…c) the historical consideration of the previous attempts to pose and resolve
scientific tasks.”70
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Following these introductory matters, Heidegger moves towards a preparation of the first
phenomenological interpretation of Paul. To accomplish this, Heidegger secures a core
phenomenon from which the relation between Paul’s lived experience and factical life itself may
be understood, and precisely as a relation. This phenomenon Heidegger indicates is the concept
of history, as it readily appears prominent in Paul’s expressions of his experience. Thus, a
destruction of the phenomenon of history must first take place to clearly elicit a significance that
will further indicate the essential relation between experience and life in the phenomenological
interpretation of Paul. As the relation itself is what is primarily at stake, Heidegger looks to the
method of formal indication to inform the overall destruction, as a formal indication of the
phenomenon of history will clearly delimit its position with respect to experience and factical
life. In this manner, the phenomenon of history will be formally indicated, and thus properly
understood in its own significance. To explain this process, Heidegger states: “The usual sense of
the historical [das Historische] says it is the temporally-becoming, and as such, past…This sense
of ‘historical’ is so general…that nothing would be lost if it were applied, without further
qualification, to factical life experience.” 71 Thus, rather than generally expressed in a manner that
neglects the precise articulation of ambiguities in the method of destruction, the concept of
history will be expressed in a formal manner as a relational indication.72
Heidegger thus brings formal indication to bear as a proper stage of phenomenological
method as it draws-out from an initial access a pre-given understanding of the relational
significations in the concept of history, and in doing so it precisely “brings no preconceived
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opinion”73 to the extraction of meaning. To address history by way of formal indication,
Heidegger thus begins:
Each experience – as experiencing, and what is experienced – can be ‘taken in the
phenomenon,’ that is to say, one can ask: 1. After the original ‘what,’ that is experienced
therein (content). 2. After the original ‘how,’ in which it is experienced (relation). 3 After
the original ‘how,’ in which the relational meaning is enacted (enactment).74
Phenomenology, as “the ‘λόγος’ of the phenomena” 75 in explicating the ‘how’ of the content of
factical lived experienced, thus indicates the relational element here between history and factical
life. Thus, this relational element of the manner of experiencing – the “‘how’ I stand with regard
to things’”76 – is what the formal indication seeks to make explicit through what in destruction is
called the ‘initial drawing-out of the pre-delineations’. As it regards history, Heidegger writes:
“If the historical is taken as the formally indicated, it is not thereby asserted that the most general
determination of the ‘historical’ as a ‘becoming in time’ delineates a final sense…Rather, the
problem of time must be grasped in the way we originally experience temporality in factical
experience….”77
As a destruction of the phenomenon of history through formal indication only serves the
greater task of illustrating the relation between experience and factical life through
phenomenological interpretations of Paul, Heidegger departs from these explicit considerations
on formal indication.78 In this manner, Heidegger now employs the previous formal indication of
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history to precisely view the relation between Paul’s experience and factical life inasmuch as
history serves as the primary expression of relation. Heidegger thus proceeds to identify the
essential phenomenon of ‘proclamation’ as the “immediate life-relation of the world of self of
Paul to the surrounding world and to the communal world of the community….” 79 Proclamation
as the locus of Paul’s factical experience thus provides a proper ground to view such relation
through a phenomenological interpretation of Paul’s letter to the Thessalonians. Here, the
preparations of the formal indication of history reach their completion, as the essential situation
of Paul in his experience of proclamation to the Thessalonians is the experience of their ‘havingbecome.’ Through this, the phenomenological interpretation thus reaches an ontological
discussion concerning factical life through the expression of Paul’s letter to the Thessalonians.
As Heidegger writes: “Having-become is not, in life, [just] any incident you like. Rather, it is
incessantly co-experienced, and indeed such that their Being [Sein] now is their having-become
[Gewordensein].”80 The essential relation of Paul’s experience to factical life itself, given by the
situation of proclamation, is thus his experience of the Thessalonians in their ‘having-become.’
In a word, “Their having-become is their Being now.” 81
It is thus through these phenomenological interpretations that Heidegger begins to
articulate the investigation of factical life in terms of being, thus introducing an approach to
ontology through phenomenology. Indeed, these ontological matters provide Heidegger with a
critical lens for his phenomenological interpretations of Augustine in the following 1921
Summer semester lecture of GA 60 where the original problem of a concrete historical Dasein as
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expressed in GA 59 can be provisionally attended to. Here, in “Augustine and Neo-Platonism,”
Heidegger continues in this fashion to actualize the potential for phenomenological
interpretations to produce characterizations of the being life seen in the previous work on Paul.
From these interpretations, Heidegger thus conducts a phenomenological investigation on the
essential manifestations of life itself given in factical experience. In this manner, from the
experiences of Augustine, Heidegger highlights an essential character of factical life expressed
as the ‘having-of-oneself’ that brings to vision “the concrete ‘worldly’ experiential complex of
enactment”82 of life experience. Through further interpretations of Augustine guided by the
elucidation of the ‘having-of-oneself’ Heidegger presents a wealth of phenomenological
explications characterizing the factical situation of existence thematized as “Dasein, the self the
being-real of life….”83 In this manner, factical life in itself ultimately reaches a thematic
articulation, of the ontological situation of facticity that now presents itself as the essential task
of explication. This, Heidegger expresses as “a certain How of the being of life”84 that is
manifest in factical life experience as the object of phenomenology.
In this manner, Heidegger’s path becomes clear as he continues phenomenological
interpretations towards ontological characterizations of factical life in the Winter 1921/22 lecture
Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (GA 61). Here, taking Aristotle as his guide,
Heidegger proceeds to explicate the essential categories of Dasein’s factical life in a progression
of the work thus far on explicating the phenomenon of life in itself. Following this text, both the
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process of phenomenological interpretations and their ontological import become explicit themes
for Heidegger in the presentation of a new formulation of phenomenology through the method of
hermeneutic interpretation. Thus, in Ontologie – Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 63) Heidegger
presents the essential problematic of explicating the being of human existence as Dasein through
phenomenology, opening the path towards ontology.
Hermeneutics
In the 1921/22 Winter semester lecture Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu
Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung,85 Heidegger begins by delimiting
the essential task of the work to form a “concrete philosophical problematic…[of] Aristotelian
philosophy”86 through phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle that constitute a state of
original concrete philosophizing out of factical life in itself. In this manner, Heidegger proceeds
towards a greater task of clearly delimiting the relation between philosophy and ontology
through phenomenological explications of life. In turn, through the thematization of the factical
life of Dasein expressed in terms of Aristotle’s categories, Heidegger reaches a new development
of the phenomenological method as he discovers a mature form of phenomenological
interpretation through hermeneutics.
To begin these phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle on the way to ontology,
Heidegger first conducts two phenomenological explications that extract the sense of
‘philosophizing’ and ‘life’ from their given pre-conceptions. In this manner, Heidegger first

85

It is worth noting that in the following 1922 Summer semester, Heidegger delivered a similar lecture titled
Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation, (Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 2005), hereafter referenced as GA 62. This change in subtitle from “Introduction to
Phenomenological Research” to “Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation” expresses the thematic shift of
Heidegger’s treatment of factical life ontologically via hermeneutics developed in GA 61.
86

GA 61: 13/12.

33

attends to an understanding of what it means ‘to philosophize,’ as opposed to the pursuit of the
history of philosophy, by examining its historical origin in factical life as expressed by Plato.
Here, through presenting the meanings of ϕιλοσοϕία [philosophy], ϕιλόσοϕος [philosopher],
ϕιλοσοϕεîν [to philosophize], and ϕιλοσοϕία μουσική [musical philosophy]. 87 Heidegger reaches
the essential concept of ‘comportment’ [Verhalten] as a relational determination. As he writes:
“This comportment is expressed in a special manner when we say that ‘studying philosophy’
must be a real ‘philosophizing,’ That means: what we relate to…is such that it determines, from
its own character, the comportment toward it. The object gives the comportment a name….” 88
This sense of relation that philosophizing holds through comportment is exceptionally decisive,
for as Heidegger finds, the essential comportment that philosophizing maintains in its relation to
factical life is determined by a sense of being [Sein]. Thus: “The object [Gehalt] of the definition
of philosophy is therefore determined as…comportment [Verhalten] to beings in terms of Being
[als Sein von Seiendem].”89
Following these considerations, Heidegger then boldly expresses what has become
evident through this notion of comportment for philosophy – “Philosophy is ‘ontology,’ indeed,
is radical ontology, and as such is phenomenological…The object of philosophy, being in their
Being, co-determines from out of itself…the comportment.” In this manner, and through the
second phenomenological explication of the signification of life as “existence, ‘being’ in and

87

GA 61: 48-50/37-38.

88

GA 61: 51/39.

89

GA 61: 58/44, (my brackets). I have inserted the original German in brackets to indicate the linguistic relation
between both object and comportment, Gehalt and Verhalten, and the two senses of being, Sein and Seiendem which
the translator has rendered as ‘Being’ and ‘beings.’

34

through life…”90 Heidegger arrives at a new articulation of the philosophical problem at hand in
the phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle: “[To] bring to experience life, as factical life,
in its objectivity and Being”91 and in doing so, “to take up the question of the objective and the
ontological character of ‘life.’ The Being of life as its ‘facticity.’”92
Having clearly delimited the route ahead, Heidegger proceeds to explicate the essential
categories of facticity through phenomenological investigations of life in itself. Though Aristotle
is not invoked through phenomenological interpretations to the extent of Paul or Augustine,
Heidegger nonetheless provides a robust account of factical life in its categories of world, caring
[Sorgen], and ruinance [Ruinanz] as a clear progression in the positive philosophical discoveries
of his phenomenological thinking.93 In this manner, the ‘hermeneutical situation’ of factical life
has been articulated through the philosophical link between phenomenology and ontology. Thus,
in the following 1922 Summer semester Ontologie – Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 61),
Heidegger then seeks a proper ontological understanding of life through a hermeneutics of
human existence, Dasein, in its essential factical character as made possible through the initial
considerations of GA 61. In this manner, phenomenology will achieve its full progression as a
philosophical method of ontology through the hermeneutical method, granting Heidegger an
access to Dasein through which an articulation can begin to emerge concerning its being.
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Heidegger begins with a remark on the meaning of ontology as the task ahead concerns
attending to the being of life as facticity. He thus presents ontology in terms of a “doctrine of
being”94 that from its root in the Ancient Greek word ὄν [being] indicates “a questioning and
defining which is directed to being as such.” 95 Relating to philosophy in terms of comportment
towards beings themselves, if being is to be a possible theme, a proper methodological path is
necessary. Thus, as Heidegger states, “it is only through phenomenology that the ontology
corresponding to it is established on a secure basis and held on an orderly course in its treatment
of problems.”96 In this manner, proceeding from the considerations of GA 61, Heidegger thus
delimits that ontology, as a phenomenological endeavor, must take its domain of study from
being itself made possible through Dasein itself “from out of which and for the sake of which,
philosophy ‘is.’”97 The overall task of an ontological understanding of factical life must thus
clearly proceed through a phenomenological investigation of Dasein, as Heidegger terms it, a
hermeneutic of facticity. To express the structure and aim of this task, Heidegger provides
preliminary remarks on the nature of the hermeneutical method and the meaning of facticity.
He begins: “‘Facticity’ is the designation we will use for the character of the being of
‘our’ ‘own’ Dasein.”98 In this manner, as Heidegger expresses, what is decisive is not the
individual character of Dasein’s being as our own, but rather that it indicates a primary
awareness as a “how of being.”99 Thus, it will be in addressing the critical ‘being-there’ [Da-
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sein] that the phenomenological hermeneutic will take its ontological charge. Heidegger
continues on to explain the nature of hermeneutics in relation to the task at hand. Through a
discussion of the origin of ἐρμηνευτιχή [hermeneutics] from its root ἐρμηνεύειν [interpreting] in
its Ancient Greek usage, Heidegger determines four critical significations that point toward a
unified meaning. In this manner, he states: “Hermeneutics is now no longer interpretation itself,
but a doctrine about the conditions, the objects, the means, and the communication and practical
application of interpretation.”100 In this manner, hermeneutics as a phenomenological method
will serve as the mode of access to Dasein itself as a ‘self-interpretation.’ Heidegger explains this
in the following manner: “Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case
our own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being…” 101 In this
manner, the ontological task of explicating Dasein in its being hermeneutically will not amount
to an interpretation of itself from without, but rather from an interpretation seated in a “how of
Dasein itself.”102 Heidegger expounds upon this until arriving at a critical determination on the
structure of the interpretation of hermeneutics as a self-interpretation of Dasein. As he writes:
“[Interpretation], which is itself part and parcel of the ‘being there of Dasein…shares in the
character of Dasein’s being….”103 Thus, in this manner, interpretation belongs to the being of
Dasein itself as a facet of human existence.
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As the nature of the hermeneutic of facticity has itself been provisionally establish with
respect to Dasein, Heidegger proceeds to presentations on the structure of the interpretation
itself. Here, as he writes: “Our theme is Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular
time. And our task: to bring this into view, have a look at it, and understand it in such a manner
that in itself its basic characteristics of its being are able to be brought into relief.” 104 Thus,
through hermeneutics, Dasein will be addressed as it shows itself in its being as being-there –
that is to say, phenomenologically. Moving further ahead towards the concrete hermeneutic,
Heidegger makes the following critical expression. As the interpretation will be conducted
through the observation of Dasein as it readily presents itself in its ‘everydayness’
[Alltäglichkeit], its primary manner of appearance, “the Dasein of today is to be interrogated by
interrogating today’s historical consciousness and philosophy…which is to be subjected to a
destruction….”105 In this manner, the being of Dasein will be explicated phenomenologically as
it is self-evident in Dasein itself. However, as Heidegger clarifies, this self-evidence is precisely
not what first appears. It must therefore be indicated how in everydayness, Dasein’s being is
concealed from immediate view.106 The hermeneutic of Dasein thus seeks to radically establish
an access to its being, as Heidegger writes: “[Hermeneutics] calls itself interpretation, i.e., it does
not merely depict matters in terms of the aspect under which they first appear…One must step
away from the subject matter initially given and back to that onto which it is based.” 107
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Thus, given this clarification, Heidegger proceeds with a discussion addressing the nature
and structure of phenomenology itself with respect to the approaching hermeneutic of Dasein.
Here, both ‘phenomenology’ and ‘phenomenon’ will be presented in a major determination from
Heidegger that proves essential to the progression of the method. To accomplish this, Heidegger
once again begins by sourcing the origins of phenomenology from the Ancient Greek
φαινόμενον [phenomenon] as it derives from φαίνεσθαι [showing itself]. In this manner,
Heidegger provides an explication of the meaning of phenomenology based on this linguistic
origination by first expressing: “A phenomenon is thus that which shows itself as something
showing itself…[it] is a mode of being-an-object and indeed a distinctive one….” 108 Passing over
the history of phenomenology in its determination of the significations of ‘phenomenon,’
Heidegger then states: “‘Phenomenon’ is thus not primarily a category, but initially has to do
with the how of access, of grasping and bringing into true safekeeping. Phenomenology is
therefore initially nothing more than a mode of research, namely: addressing something just as it
shows itself and only to the extent that it shows itself.” 109
Having sufficiently prepared the way for the hermeneutics of facticity from which the
being of Dasein is to be explicated, Heidegger puts these phenomenological considerations to
work as he now attends to Dasein in its everyday being-there. In this manner, guided by the
formal indication: “the being-there of Dasein (factical life) is being in a world [Sein in einer
Welt].”110 Heidegger delves into descriptions of everydayness from which several key

GA 2: 27-39/26-37 for Heidegger’s development of this concept as disclosure [Erschliessen] in his presentation of
the phenomenological method of investigation.
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ontological determinations are extracted. 111 Heidegger thus provisionally explicates Dasein’s
being-there, factical life itself, through the mode of everydayness through hermeneutics,
providing another critical demonstration of phenomenology in its progression towards a method
of ontology.
Heidegger’s presentation of this lecture in the 1923 Summer semester marks a decisive
achievement in the progression of his phenomenological thinking as an approach to philosophy.
The initiation of phenomenology as the path to ontology alongside the resulting determinations
made in explicating the factical life of Dasein in its being-there provides an essential
demonstration of the power of Heidegger as a phenomenologist and indeed announces a radical
new direction for his philosophical work. Following this lecture, Heidegger presents two more
lectures concerning the reworking of the definition of phenomenology as an outgrowth of his
critiques of the tradition of philosophy on the way to a complete formulation of phenomenology
as the method of ontology and the thinking of being through Dasein. Thus, in Einführung in die
phänomenologische Forschung (GA 17) and Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA
20), the formulation of a proper understanding of phenomenology in its ontological possibility is
taken as Heidegger’s major project, addressing key figures in the history of philosophy
responsible for both the progression and mischaracterization of phenomenology and ontology. In
his address of these mistakes in the tradition, Heidegger propels phenomenology ahead through
new definitions that secure methodological access to the growing project of an existential
ontology of the being of Dasein.
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Phenomenology as Such
Heidegger begins Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung by expressing the
objectives of the work as an address of phenomenology, as it originates in Aristotle’s De Anima
through a discussion of ϕαινόμενον [phenomenon] and λόγοσ [discourse], and of Husserl’s
breakthroughs in the development of phenomenology. At heart, what these matters aim to secure
is that phenomenology be properly formulated as a method of “understanding life in itself in its
genuine being and answering the question of its character of being.”112 Thus, Heidegger begins
his analysis into the origin of phenomenology on the way to a proper understanding of its
relation to being. He writes: “Phenomenology is put together from λόγοσ and ϕαινόμενον.
Φαινόμενον means: something that shows itself. Φαίνομαι is the same as ‘to show itself,’ ϕαίνω
the same as ‘to bring something to the light of day.’ The stem is ϕα; this is connected with ϕῶς
which is the same as light, daylightness.”113 What is decisive here, as Heidegger indicates, is that
daylight is not something seen itself – rather, it provides the condition for other things to appear
in it. Thus, Heidegger writes: “Aristotle discovered that daylightness is not a body…that it does
not move, but is instead the heaven’s actual manner of existing, allowing things to be seen, the
day’s being. Daylight is a manner of presence….”114
In this way, Aristotle is only speaking of daylight as it shows itself: “Daylight does not
move. Only the sun moves, the presence of which is the daylight. Whoever says that daylight
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moves is speaking παρὰ τὰ ϕαινόμενα, he is speaking past what shows itself.” 115 From these
considerations, Heidegger then extracts the precise relation between the phenomenon and being
itself. In this manner: “Φαινόμενον is what shows itself of itself as existing; it is encountered by
life insofar as life stands towards its world in such a way that it sees the world, perceives it at all
in the αἴσθεσις [perception].”116 It is thus delimited that phenomena serve as the basis for a study
of beings in their primary manner of appearance, as Heidegger writes: “The expression
ϕαινόμενον is accordingly not a conceptual category, but instead a manner of being, how
something is encountered and, indeed, encountered in the first and, as such, first legitimate
way.”117 He continues: “Τα ϕαινόμενα [that which shows itself] can be represented by τὰ ὄντα
[that which exists]; it is what is always already here, what we encounter the moment we open our
eyes. It does not need first to be disclosed, but is frequently covered up.” 118
Heidegger then examines the counterpart term of phenomenology, λόγοσ. He begins:
“Φωνή [phonē]…is a type of sound made into something animate, a noise made by something
living…A sound is made when something in something knocks on something…The voice,
however, is in with the being of something living…”119 To thus grasp λόγοσ by way of voice, it
is thus in returning back to human being that its meaning is made clear. Here, it is precisely the
worldly character of human existence that delimits the signification of the voice as λόγοσ. As
Heidegger writes: “Insofar as a human being is in the world and wants something in the world
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and wants it with himself, he speaks. He speaks insofar as something like a world is uncovered
for him as a matter of concern and he is uncovered to himself in this ‘for him.’”120 However, as
Heidegger clarifies, the voice of the human being is no mere tool for speech. Rather, “Language
is the being and becoming of the human being himself.” 121 The λόγοσ is thus not simply a
property – it is the expression of being itself through the voice. In this manner, the λόγοσ thus
serves phenomenology as it presents what shows itself, exists, ϕαινόμενον. Heidegger presents
this revelatory character of speech in the following manner:
We have determined ϕαινόμενον to be what shows itself as immediately existing (the
world is meant). In relation to what exists in this way, talking has a special function. The
λόγοσ ἀποϕαντικός [revelatory speech] is the sort of talking with the world, by means of
which the existing world is pointed out as existing. (Ἀποϕαίνεσθαι is “letting something
be seen from itself in its way of existing).” 122
These initial explications of phenomenology’s origins in ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ provide a key
direction towards an ontological conception of the methodology. Having prepared these matters,
Heidegger then proceeds to address Husserl’s phenomenological developments ultimately aimed
at indicating the lack of attention to being in his phenomenology. 123
As these matters serve to thus establish a further understanding of phenomenology,
Heidegger proceeds in the 1925 Summer semester Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs
(GA 20) to drastically expand on this critique of the development of phenomenology, resulting in
further considerations on the phenomenological method itself and its relationship to ontology.
Here, Heidegger begins by addressing the breakthroughs in phenomenology made by Husserl
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and for the most part of the introductory matters discusses phenomenology using Husserl’s
terminology.124 From these considerations Heidegger then presents another explicit discussion on
the method of phenomenology, largely progressing from the linguistic origin found in Aristotle
from GA 17. However, progressing from these initial considerations, Heidegger expresses an
immensely rich formulation of phenomenology and the phenomenological method on the way to
a critical review of the history of phenomenology from which the explication of Dasein in its
basic constitution of ‘being-in-the-world’ [In-der-Welt-sein] may begin – bringing forth a new
era in Heidegger’s phenomenological thought. As he writes: “There is no ontology alongside
phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology.”125
Heidegger begins with an expansion of his initial considerations on ‘comportment’ as an
essential directedness towards the world as he finds this concept more robustly expressed
through Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Here, what is decisive for Heidegger is that
intentionality, from intentio meaning literally “directing-itself-toward”126 as the essential
comportment in all lived experience does not simply grasp things perceptually, but rather it
apprehends what appears as ‘bodily presence’ [Leibhaftigkeit].127 As Heidegger writes, in this
manner “the entity which presents itself as perceived has the feature of being bodily-there
[Leibhaft-da]. Not only is it given as itself, but as itself in its bodily presence.” 128 To illustrate
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this, Heidegger gives a phenomenological description of a perceived entity – a chair. His
description is as follows:
What do I see in my ‘natural’ perception in which I now live and dwell and am here in
this room; what can I say about the chair? I would say that it stands in Room 24 next to
the desk, and it is probably used by lecturers who prefer to sit while they lecture. It is not
just any chair but a very particular one, the desk chair in Room 24 at Marburg University,
perhaps somewhat worse for wear and poorly painted in the factory from which it
evidently came.129
In this manner, the comportment towards the world manifest through perception thus grasps the
chair as it is given, and as such, in its bodily presence. Thus, as Heidegger thus writes: “What is
perceived in this ‘natural’ perception we shall designate as a thing of the environing world, or
simply the environmental thing.”130 In its particular bodily-givenness, the chair itself thus
becomes a possible perceptual given as a thing of the environment.
As this concerns the definition of phenomenology, Heidegger proceeds with these matters
to a discussion of what is at stake concerning this understanding of intentionality. As he writes:
“Such a directly seeing apprehension and accentuation is traditionally called description.
Phenomenology’s mode of treatment is descriptive. To be more exact, description is an
accentuating articulation of what is in itself intuited…the description is analytical.”131 In this
manner, from such direct ‘self-apprehension’ of what is given as description Heidegger states:
“Phenomenology is the analytic description of intentionality in its apriori.”132 Having established
an understanding of the relation within phenomenology, Heidegger proceeds to a proper
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discussion of its meaning. Here, phenomenology is once again traced back to its linguistic
origins as found in Aristotle.133 Thus from ϕαινόμενον [that which shows itself] in its combined
presentation with λόγοσ [discourse] in its revelatory character as ἀποϕαίνεσθαι [letting the
spoken be seen in itself],134 ‘phenomenology’ then expresses itself as “letting the manifest in
itself be seen from itself.”135 This however, Heidegger indicates, says nothing more than “back to
the matters themselves”136 or defining phenomenology as “the science of phenomena.”137 Thus,
Heidegger reaches a critical consideration concerning the definition, and thus the procedure of
phenomenology.
On this, he writes: “The term ‘phenomenon’ however says nothing about the being of the
objects under study, but refers only to the way they are encountered.”138 What is decisive for
phenomenology is thus the ‘how’ of the encounter with respect to the appearance of phenomena.
It is thus critical for phenomenology to begin by securing a proper access to phenomena, as
Heidegger writes: “Admittedly, what can in itself be exhibited and is to be exhibited can
nonetheless be covered up…As research work, phenomenology is precisely the work of laying
open and letting be seen, understood as the methodologically dismantling of concealments.” 139
With this essential explication of phenomenology, Heidegger proceeds to address the
development of phenomenology to precisely indicate the moments of error where an original
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phenomenological understanding was missed or concealed. 140 Following this, Heidegger then
moves towards the core work of GA 20, the phenomenological explication of the ontology of
Dasein in its basic constitution of being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein] and the exposition of the
phenomenon of time through temporality as the horizon of Dasein’s being. 141 In this task,
Heidegger produces a wealth of ontological determinations on the being of Dasein through
being-in-the-world that serve to present the full power of phenomenology as a method to
ontology through a provisional explication that will become the essential content for Heidegger’s
famous 1927 publication Sein und Zeit (GA 2).

140

See GA 20: 123-182/90-131 for further discussion.
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See GA 20: 346-442/251-320 for further discussion.
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Chapter 2: Phenomenology as the Method of Ontology
My task in this chapter is to present Heidegger’s development of the phenomenological
method as it appears in his major works from 1927-1929. Through an examination of key texts
from this time, it will be shown how phenomenology serves Heidegger as the method of
ontology, one that seeks to disclose the being of beings towards an understanding of being itself
through Dasein. In this manner, phenomenology is first presented as “the way of access to, and
the demonstrative manner of determination…of ontology” 1 for Heidegger’s initial project of the
Daseinanalytik in his first major publication Sein und Zeit (GA 2) in the Spring of 1927, through
which the question of being itself [Seinsfrage] can be addressed. Following this, in the 1927
Summer semester lecture course Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24), Heidegger
begins to focus on the understanding of being [Seinsverständnis] that makes possible such a
relation to being, indeed for the task of formulating four new basic problems of phenomenology.
In this work, phenomenology is thus further presented as a three-fold method of ontology that
begins with the appearance of beings and works towards being itself through the stages of
reduction, construction, and destruction. From this direct methodological formulation, Heidegger
begins to reconsider the object of phenomenology and ultimately repositions its essential task,
stating: “being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy…philosophy is not a science of beings
but of being…ontology.”2

1

Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), 35, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh,
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 35, hereafter referenced as GA 2. I have elected the use of Joan Stambaugh’s 2010
translation of Sein und Zeit over John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson’s. However, alongside the original German
edition, the Macquarrie-Robinson translation was still referenced for comparison during research. I have continued
my citations using the German/English pagination with Stambaugh’s translation.
2

GA 24: 15/11. For further discussion, see William Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2003).
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Heidegger then gains a new thematic understanding of the aim of phenomenology as the
“radical grounding of the possibility of ontological knowledge” 3 from the 1927/28 Winter
semester lecture Phenomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA
25). From this task, he indicates two essential philosophical problematics: the possibility of
ontological knowledge and the resulting problem of the ‘knowing comportment,’ the
transcendence of Dasein, which makes possible any relation to being whatsoever. Finally, from
these essential ontological problematics discovered through phenomenological interpretations of
Kant’s Critique, Heidegger develops a direct means of addressing the possibility of the
Seinsverständnis through an understanding of metaphysics from the Ancient Greek μετά τά
φυσικά as “inquiry beyond or over beings” 4 to being itself. Expressed in Was ist Metaphysik?
(GA 9), his inaugural lecture upon succeeding Husserl as professor at Freiburg University, it is
here that phenomenology reaches a critical stage of development from its original position in
ontology as the method of the disclosure of being through beings. For here, as the approach to
philosophy through metaphysics, phenomenology becomes the essential disclosure of the
possibility of being through the unfolding [Entfaltung] and indeed self-unfolding of the nihilating
character of the ‘nothing’ [das Nichts].5
As it has been made clear in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s development of
phenomenology as the method of ontology indeed begins well before the publication of Sein und

3

Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, (Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1995), 431, Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans.
Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 292, hereafter referenced as GA
25.
4

Martin Heidegger, “Was ist Metaphysik?” in Wegmarken, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 118,
“What is Metaphysics?” in Pathmarks, trans. David Farrell Krell, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998),
93, hereafter referenced as GA 9.
5

GA 9: 103/82.
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Zeit in 1927, famous for Heidegger’s address of being [Sein] through an analysis of human being
[Dasein]. In fact, the early indications of this ontological direction of phenomenology appear as
early as 19196 while much of the first division of Sein und Zeit appears in the 1925 Summer
lecture Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20). However, as Sein und Zeit directly
attest, it is this work itself that marks a critical stage of development for Heidegger’s
phenomenological method. It is thus worth providing clarificatory remarks on the nature of
phenomenological method in Sein und Zeit regarding its position in this development and its
renown as Heidegger’s most famous work. Here, the method appears far less procedural as a
result of a gradual progression throughout the preceding works and is rather guided by revelatory
disclosure and hermeneutic interpretation as the nature of the works in this period reflect.
Alongside this, Sein und Zeit is altogether different in its aim than earlier works that were for the
most part concerned with presenting Heidegger’s considerations and demonstrations on the
structure of the method itself. In this manner, beginning in 1927 phenomenology becomes far
more radically understood in terms of examination and explication, investigation and
interpretation, specifically as Heidegger employs it through the Daseinanaytik. Thus, in Sein und
Zeit, much of the phenomenological method is understood entirely by its formal expression as:
“ἀποϕαίνεσθαι τά φαινόμενα – to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself
from itself.”7
In this manner, the distinction between this stage of development with respect to the
earlier formulation of the phenomenological method is made quite apparent: Beforehand,
Heidegger would explicitly detail the methodological steps of phenomenological research to

6

See Chapter 1, ftn. 3 for further discussion.

7

GA 2: 34/32.
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examine and explicate phenomena in their essential character, whereas in this text a budding
phenomenologist may be left to question how and by what means the being of beings are to be
made manifest, where the ‘four senses of World [Welt]’8 originate, how the ‘care [Sorge] myth’
stands as source of interpretation for Dasein’s being, 9 or how the temporality [Zeitlichkeit] of
Dasein is explicated from descriptions of the ‘everyday concept of time.’ 10 The considerations
presented in the first chapter make-way towards understanding these, as this is by no means a
fault on Heidegger’s part. As the task at hand in GA 2 is to utilize the method as a specific mode
of ontological research, the discussion of phenomenological method therein is thus only to
delineate the manner of approach to the Daseinanalytik. However, as I aim to make clear, there
is far more of the phenomenological method to be ascertained than from Heidegger’s remarks, as
it is unequivocally and foundationally ingrained in Heidegger’s thinking as his very approach to
philosophy itself. It is thus from paying close attention to his remarks and with a watchful eye
towards his operations that phenomenology as a method to ontology comes into its own. For the
critical reader must not approach Sein und Zeit as the presentation of ‘a philosophy’ which has its
meaning altogether in the understanding of worldview [Weltanschauung] that phenomenology
directly avoids in its research. Rather, to fully understand Heidegger and indeed “better than he
understood himself…”11 the ontological determinations of the structures of Dasein’s being must
be approached as phenomenological considerations – a task that always requires the return to an
understanding of phenomenology itself.

8

GA 2: 64-65/64-65.

9

GA 2: 197-198/190-191.

10

GA 2: 407-409/388-389.

11

GA 25: 3/2.
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Thus, to illustrate Heidegger’s development of phenomenology as the method of
ontology from the approach to the Daseinanalytik to the unfolding of being and the possibility of
the Seinsverständnis through metaphysics, I will present this progression as follows:
In “Investigation and Interpretation,” I will present Heidegger’s ontological
understanding of phenomenology as expressed in the 1927 publication Sein und Zeit. Here, it
shall be made clear in what sense phenomenology appears as the method of the disclosure of the
being of beings understood through the combined sense of ϕαινόμενον [phenomenon] and λόγοσ
[discourse], alongside Heidegger’s employment of phenomenological investigation and
interpretation in the Daseinanalytik. Following these matters, in “Reduction, Construction,
Destruction,” I will present Heidegger’s reformulation of the phenomenological method of
ontology as expressed in Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24). In this text,
referring to the 1919/20 lecture of the same title, Heidegger seeks to explicate four basic
problems of phenomenology from four traditional ontological theses through phenomenological
interpretation. From this, I will show how Heidegger’s presentation of the three-fold
phenomenological method of reduction, construction, and destruction makes possible an access
to the Seinsverständnis through investigation into the appearance of beings that moves towards
being itself.
In “Interpretations of Kant,” I will present Heidegger’s essential considerations on the
problem of ontological knowledge and the problem of the transcendence of Dasein, the ‘knowing
comportment’ of the Seinsverständnis as expressed in Phenomenologische Interpretationen von
Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA 25). From these matters it will be shown how
phenomenology achieves a direct access to the possibility of ontology through the
Seinsverständnis, preparing the way for an understanding of metaphysics as the thinking of being
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beyond beings. Finally, in “Metaphysics,” these considerations will be brought to bear as
Heidegger addresses the meaning of metaphysics in the inaugural lecture Was ist Metaphysik?
(GA 9). From this text it shall be made clear in what sense Heidegger’s understanding of
metaphysics as μετά τά φυσιχά, beyond beings, positions phenomenology as the essential
method of ontology through the metaphysical unfolding of the nothing.
Investigation and Interpretation
I begin with Sein und Zeit, Heidegger’s first major publication and indeed his first major
display of the potential of phenomenology as an approach to philosophy and method to ontology.
Here, Heidegger seeks an understanding of the being of Dasein, human being, through which an
understanding of being itself can be made accessible. To accomplish this, Heidegger thus
employs phenomenology as the method of ontology, which through investigation and
interpretation of the being of Dasein, provides an manner of addressing traditional problematics
of being [Sein], worldhood [Weltlichkeit], care [Sorge], and time [Zeit] in search of a new,
authentic understanding of the being of Dasein and the meaning of being in general. To breach
these matters and present Heidegger’s ontological understanding of phenomenology in Sein und
Zeit, I will first present the appearance of phenomenology in Heidegger’s introductory remarks
where phenomenology appears as employed by Heidegger as his direct approach to philosophy.
In this manner, the structure of Sein und Zeit in its dual task of addressing the question of being
[Seinsfrage] and Daseinanalytik will be exposed as fundamentally phenomenological itself.
Phenomenology first appears at-work as the method to ontology in GA 2 as Heidegger
begins the text in his usual fashion by emphatically calling attention to the most fundamental for
philosophy, the Seinsfrage, and explicitly citing three prejudices maintained by the tradition of
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philosophy that serve to neglect its appearance as a serious theme. 12 Yet, as Heidegger expresses,
before the question of the meaning of being can be attended to as such a basic problem of
philosophy, and indeed through the analysis of the being of Dasein [Daseinanalytik], it first must
me raised anew and properly understood. Thus, as Heidegger writes: “The question of the
meaning of Being must be formulated. If it is a – or even the fundamental question, such
questioning needs the suitable transparency.” 13 Heidegger then proceeds to express the
phenomenological structure of questioning itself, in order to present a proper understanding for
the sake of formulating the question of the meaning of being. Heidegger thus states: “Every
questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its lead beforehand from what is sought.” 14 To
further extract this phenomenon of questioning in its relation to what is questioned, Heidegger
presents the three-fold structure of questioning centered on the German verb fragen [to question].
Here, through modifications in its prefix, questioning receives its coordinate relations to
what is questioned as Heidegger writes: “As questioning about…questioning has what it asks
about [Gefragtes]. All asking about…is in some way an inquiring of…Besides what is asked,
what is interrogated [Befragtes] also belongs to questioning…As what is really intended, what is
to be ascertained [Erfragtes] lies in what is questioned; here questioning arrives at its goal.” 15 To
import this phenomenal structure of questioning to the ontological task of formulating the
question of the meaning of being, Heidegger thus writes:
What is asked about [Gefragtes] in the question to be elaborated is being, that which
determines beings as beings…Hence, what is to be ascertained [Erfragtes], the meaning
12

GA 2: 2-4/1-3. Here, Heidegger addresses three prejudices that have caused the question of being (Seinsfrage) to
be forgotten – universality, indefinability, and self-evidence.
13

GA 2: 5/4.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. Note: this structure of questioning appears in this same formulation before in GA 20: 194-198/144-147
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of being, will require its own conceptualization…Insofar as being constitutes what is
asked about, and insofar as being means the being of beings, beings themselves turn out
to be what is interrogated [Befragtes] in the question of being. Beings are, so to speak,
interrogated with regard to their being.16
In this manner, Heidegger expresses the essential character of questioning, anticipatory
understanding,17 as that which will here direct the question of being through being itself, indeed
as the being of some being. To further concretize these matters, Heidegger explains:
Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being – one who questions –
transparent in its being. Asking this question, as a mode of being of a being is itself
essentially determined by what is asked about in it – being. This being [Seiende], which
we ourselves in each case are and which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its
being, we formulate terminologically as Dasein.18
In this manner, what Heidegger expresses as the Seinsverständnis [understanding of
being] is found to be an essential determination of Dasein’s very being. 19 As he explains:
[Dasein] is ontically distinguished be the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its
very being […daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht].20 Indeed, it is
this very ontological character of Dasein in its Seinsverständnis that prioritizes it for an access to
being over other beings. However, as Heidegger expresses this distinction between Dasein and
other beings, he at the same time provides a new essential and radical differentiation for

16

GA 2: 6/5.
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Heidegger explains this further at GA 2: 5/4: “As seeking, questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks.
The meaning of being must therefore already be available to us in a certain way.” Note: the character of availability
expressed in anticipatory understanding is the principle function of the for-having which makes possible destruction
and formal indication on the basis of Dasein’s Seinsverständnis. Heidegger expresses this at GA 2: 8/7:
“‘Presupposing’ being has the character of taking a preliminary look at being in such a way that on the basis of this
look being that are already given are tentatively articulated in their being. This guiding look at being grows out of
the average understanding of being in which we are always already involved and which ultimately belongs to the
essential constitution of Dasein itself.”
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phenomenological ontology which will later be understood as ontological difference. 21 In this
manner, as being [Sein] and beings [Seienden] – the ontological [ontologische] and ontical
[ontisch] – are thus distinguished, Heidegger provides an essential differentiation that delimits
the route of phenomenology. Thus, as what remains decisive in Sein und Zeit is the
phenomenology of human being through Dasein, the investigation is properly understood as a
phenomenological investigation into the appearance of Dasein as a being [Seiende] from which
its being [Sein] can be explicated and understood through phenomenological interpretation. In
this manner, Dasein has a direct access to being itself through this ontological difference as
Heidegger states: “The ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological.”22
Furthermore, as it serves the basis for this Daseinanalytik, Heidegger in this manner also
distinguishes the task of an understanding of the being of beings from an understanding of being
[Seinsverständnis] in general – what will soon after Sein und Zeit become the possibility of pure
ontological knowledge.23 Thus, from an understanding of ontological difference, Heidegger
imparts: “Thus fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can originate, must
be sought in the existential analysis of Dasein.”24
From this initial display of phenomenology in Sein und Zeit – the traditional neglect of
the Seinsfrage, the phenomenal structure of questioning, the priority of Dasein, and ontological
difference – Heidegger then proceeds to address the manner of access to Dasein, outlining the
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See GA 24: 22-23/17 for further discussion
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GA 2: 12/11.
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This task is further outlined in GA 24 and 25, as addressed in the second and third sub-sections of this chapter.
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GA 2: 13/12. It is worth noting that through the existential component of the Daseinanalytik, what results through
the ultimate considerations on authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] is a phenomenology that extracts authentic Dasein from
its ownmost potentiality of being [eigenstes Seinkönnen]. Here, what is interesting is rather than destroying personal
context as in GA 58, Sein und Zeit expresses a rendering of one’s context authentically as Dasein’s own.
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nature of the Daseinanalytik and in doing so presenting the project of Sein und Zeit as a true
work of phenomenology. Here, what is decisive is to choose the proper access to Dasein so that
its relation to being will become manifest, self-evident with immediacy – to let Dasein ‘showitself’ in its predominant mode of being, and in this manner to situate phenomenology as the
approach to a fundamental ontology. As Heidegger writes: “The manner of access and
interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can show itself to itself on its
own terms. And furthermore, this manner should show that being as it is initially and for the
most part – in its average everydayness [durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit].”25 In this manner, as
Heidegger has stated many times before, such an access does not come by first determining the
investigation from without. As he writes: “Hence the first concern in the question of being must
be an analysis of Dasein…Expressed negatively, no arbitrary idea of being and reality, no matter
how ‘self-evident’ it is, may be brought to bear on this being in a dogmatically constructed
way….”26 Rather, as Heidegger has developed phenomenology as the specific method to be
employed, it is from a direct examination and explication, or in Heidegger’s words, investigation
and interpretation into Dasein exactly as it shows itself. 27
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GA 25: 16/16. Here, there is a similar altitudinal approach in the delimiting of the subject-matter of
phenomenology as in Husserl’s Ideen. Yet, as this has been remarked in the previous chapter, it is worth noting that
the essential nature of Heidegger’s employment of phenomenology has radically changed from its previous iteration
concerned with the details of first-person factical life experience. However, the examination of Dasein that
comprises GA 2 there are similar demonstrations given to isolate the structures of its being, albeit with far less
detail.
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Thus, the Daseinanalytik begins at a phenomenologically critical position itself, as Heidegger remarks at GA 2:
15/15: “True, Dasein is ontically not only what is near or even nearest – we ourselves are it, each of us.
Nevertheless, or precisely for this reason, it is ontologically what is farthest.” Indeed, this further serves the
determination of Dasein’s phenomenal character of mineness [Jemeinigkeit]. For further discussion, see François
Raffoul, “The Ontology of Mineness,” in Heidegger and the Subject, (New York: Humanity Books, 1998), 208-249.
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Thus, with such an approach, Heidegger expresses in what manner he shall proceed in
Sein und Zeit phenomenologically as he states: “By looking at the fundamental constitution of
the everydayness of Dasein we shall bring out in a preparatory way the being of this being.” 28 To
accomplish this, Heidegger expresses that Dasein will be examined as it appears in such an
average everyday mode of appearance – its primary mode of being and a fundamental structure
of Dasein which he terms being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein]. Indeed, it is this coordinate
structure that will be analyzed and through which Heidegger will explicate the phenomenal
characteristics of Dasein’s being such as mineness [Jemeinigkeit], equipmentality
[Zuhandenheit], worldhood [Weltlichkeit], care [Sorge], death [Tod], time [Zeit], and authenticity
[Eigentlichkeit].29 However, before commencing with this task of investigation and interpretation
of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, Heidegger provides two explicit methodological discussions that
serve to characterize and guide the project of Sein und Zeit: the destruction of the history of
ontology and the phenomenological method of investigation. I shall now present these explicit
remarks by Heidegger that further serve to express phenomenology in its development as a
method of ontology.
The concept of history and its specific role in phenomenological destruction has been
already addressed directly in the previous chapter. However, it reaches a more radical and
precise presentation in Sein und Zeit as Heidegger predicates his necessity for a fundamental
ontology on the destruction of the history of ontology. In this manner, history is not only a
phenomenon that serves to insight dogmatism in the tradition of philosophy, but as Heidegger
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GA 2: 17/17.

29

This is not an exhaustive list of the phenomenal characters of Dasein’s being.
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explains, it belongs as an essential element of the being of Dasein itself called historicity
[Geschichtelichkeit]. As Heidegger writes:
In its factical being Dasein always is how and ‘what’ it already was. Whether explicitly
or not, it is its past…In its manner of existing at any given time, and thus also with the
understanding of being that belongs to it, Dasein grows into a customary interpretation of
itself and grows up on that interpretation…This understanding discloses the possibilities
of its being and regulates them. Its own past…does not follow after Dasein but rather
always already goes ahead of it.30
In this manner, through Dasein’s essential character of historicity, its own past which manifests
itself through tradition reaches it emphatically in its average everydayness. Thus, there are
several critical consequences pertaining to the effects of historicity on Dasein. As Heidegger
explains: “Dasein not only has the inclination to be entangled in the world in which it is and to
interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light; at the same time Dasein is also
entangled in a tradition which it more or less explicitly grasps. This tradition deprives Dasein of
its own leadership in questioning and choosing.”31 In its most vindictive effects, as Heidegger
expresses, tradition serves to dominate Dasein’s ontological pursuits in its concern over its being
and in another form through its pursuit of the meaning of being in general. Heidegger explains
this in the following way: “The tradition that hereby gains dominance makes what it ‘transmits’
so little accessible that initially and for the most part it covers it over instead. What has been
handed down is handed over to obviousness; it bars those original ‘wellsprings’ out of which the
traditional categories and concept were in part genuinely drawn.” 32
Thus, if the question of the meaning of being is to be raised anew in its own light through
the revival of philosophy’s original experience and basic problems, this tradition is what needs
30

GA2: 20/19.

31

GA2: 21/20.

32

GA 2: 21/20-21.
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be radically destroyed. As Heidegger writes: “We understand this task as the destruction of the
traditional content of ancient ontology which is to be carried out along the guidelines of the
question of being. This destruction is based upon the original experiences in which the first, and
subsequently guiding, determinations of being were gained.” 33 Indeed, it is this manner that
Heidegger presents destruction from its previous position in the development of the
phenomenological method as he states: “Destruction does not relate itself in a negative way to
the past: its critique concerns ‘today’ and the dominant way we treat the history of
ontology…Destruction does not wish to bury the past in nullity; it has a positive intent.”34
Following these matters, Heidegger then turns towards an address of ontology itself in the
analysis of the question of being through the phenomenological method. Here, phenomenology is
delimited as the essential path towards ontology which Heidegger explains through the
presentation of a steadily-developing analysis of the term phenomenology from the Ancient
Greek ϕαινόμενον [phenomenon] and λόγοσ [discourse]. Thus, to prepare for the Daseinanalytik
which shall be conducted phenomenologically, Heidegger proceeds with this discussion to reach
an essential understanding of phenomenological investigation through unconcealment and
disclosure through άλήφεια, an Ancient Greek concept of truth. 35 Heidegger thus begins by
expressing in what sense the treatment of the question of the meaning of being is to be
phenomenological. As it follows his considerations on destruction of the tradition of ontology,
Heidegger first delimits: “With this term the treatise dictates for itself neither a ‘standpoint’ nor a
‘direction,’ because phenomenology is neither of these…The expression ‘phenomenology’
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signifies primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize the what of the object of
philosophical research…but the how of such research.” 36 In this manner, similarly to the
phenomenal structure of questioning, phenomenological investigation thus remains guided solely
by what is sought in the questioning itself.
Thus, as Heidegger writes: “The more genuinely effective a concept of method is…the
more originally it is rooted in confrontation with the things themselves and the farther away it
moves from what we call a technical device….” 37 Instead, and in this very sense, Heidegger
expresses phenomenology through the traditional maxim ‘to the things themselves,’ which he
explains in the following way: “It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental
findings; it is also opposed to taking over concepts only seemingly demonstrated; and likewise to
pseudo-questions which often are spread abroad as ‘problems’ for generations.” 38
However, Heidegger remarks that this mere formulation of a maxim to guide
phenomenological research has yet to penetrate the essential meaning of phenomenology. Thus,
Heidegger proceeds with a presentation of the meaning of phenomenology to ground its guiding
method. As he writes: “The expression has two components: phenomenon and logos. Both go
back to the Greek terms ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ. Viewed extrinsically, the word phenomenology
is formed like the terms theology, biology, sociology…Accordingly, phenomenology would be
the science of phenomena.”39 Thus, Heidegger first addresses ϕαινόμενον in search of its
meaning with respect to phenomenology. He writes:
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GA 2: 27/26.
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The Greek expression ϕαινόμενον, from which the term ‘phenomenon’ derives, comes
from the verb φαίνεσθαι, meaing ‘to show itself.’ Thus ϕαινόμενον means: what shows
itself, the self-showing, the manifest. φαίνεσθαι itself is a middle voice construction of
φαίνω, to bring into daylight, to place in brightness…Thus the meaning of the expression
phenomenon is established as what shows itself in itself, what is manifest.40
From this explanation, Heidegger continues to address the nature of phenomenon as the selfshowing with respect to its various modes of access and appearance. On this, he writes: “Beings
can show themselves from themselves in various ways, depending on the mode of access to
them. The possibility even exists that they can show themselves as they are not in themselves.”41
In this manner, as Heidegger explains, rather the phenomenon appears as a semblance
[Schein]: “In this self-showing beings ‘look like…’ Such self-showing [Sichzeigen] we call
seeming [Scheinen]… ϕαινόμενον άγαθόν means a good that looks like – but ‘in reality’ is not
what it gives itself out to be.”42 Heidegger then proceeds further to address the notion of
appearance [Erscheinen] with respect to phenomenon, as he writes:
Thus, one speaks of ‘appearances of symptoms of illness.’ What is meant by this are
occurrences in the body that show themselves and in this self-showing as such ‘indicate’
something that does not show itself…Appearance, as the appearance ‘of something,’ thus
precisely does not mean that something shows itself; rather, it means that something
which does not show itself announces itself through something that does show itself.
Appearing is a not showing itself.43
Having determined the various understandings that arrive with the notion of ϕαινόμενον,
Heidegger then presents its essential meaning with respect to phenomenology as a method. On
this, he writes: “Phenomenon – the self-showing in itself – means a distinctive way something
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can be encountered. On the other hand, appearance means a referential relation in beings
themselves such that what does the referring (the announcing) can fulfill its possible function
only if it shows itself in itself – only if it is a ‘phenomenon.’” 44 Indeed, as it relates to the
phenomenological investigation of Dasein, what is here decisive is that, like the distinguishing of
ontological difference, what appears as phenomena are beings themselves – and for Sein und Zeit
Dasein specifically. However, as Heidegger indicates through the notion of appearing
[Erscheinung], what remains hidden, what announces itself through the phenomena of beings is
being itself. Thus, as Dasein is to be interrogated, it is clearly delimited that through an
investigation into the appearance of Dasein as a phenomenon through its average everyday
being-in-the-world, the very mode of appearing itself, Dasein’s being, can be accessed. 45
Following this presentation on the meaning of ϕαινόμενον, Heidegger then moves to a
discussion of the meaning of λόγοσ. Here, the critical element of λόγοσ in its ‘letting something
be seen’ thus provides an account of the revelatory character of discourse. Heidegger begins by
expressing the essential meaning of λόγοσ as discourse [Rede] and further investigating its
nature. He thus writes:
…λόγοσ as discourse really means δελοῦν, to make manifest ‘what is being talked about’
in discourse. Aristotle explicates this function of discourse more precisely as
ἀποϕαίνεσθαι. λόγοσ lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι), namely what is being talked
about, and indeed for the speaker…Discourse ‘lets us see,’ άπό…from itself, what is
being talks about. In discourse (άποφανσις), insofar as it is genuine, what is said should
be derived from what is being talked about. 46

44

GA 2: 31/29.

45

These remarks are further clarified as Heidegger writes GA 2: 29/28: “Appearing is an announcing of itself
through something that shows itself.” For further discussion, see François Raffoul, Thinking of the Event,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming).
46

GA 2: 32/30-31. For further discussion on ύνθηεσις [synthesis] see GA 2: 33/31.

63

It is from this essential revelatory character of άποφανσις in discourse that Heidegger extracts the
relation between truth and λόγοσ.47 Thus, as it is termed by Heidegger, this ‘apophantic speech’
serves an essential determination for the understanding of λόγοσ with respect to phenomenology.
As he writes:
Furthermore, because λόγοσ lets something be seen, it can therefore be true or false. But
everything depends on staying clear of any concept of truth construed in the sense of
‘correspondence’ or ‘accordance’ [Ubereinstimmung]. This idea is by no means the
primary one in the concept of άλήθεια. The ‘being-true’ of λόγοσ as άληθεύειν means: to
take beings that are being talked about in λέγειν as άποφαίνεσθαι out of their
concealment; to let them be seen as something unconcealed (άλεθές); to discover them.48
Having addressed ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ individually, Heidegger now investigates their
unified meaning to present a guiding understanding of phenomenology as a method. In this
manner, Heidegger thus begins: “The expression ‘phenomenology’ can be formulated in Greek
as λέγειν τά φαινόμενα. But λέγειν means ἀποϕαίνεσθαι. Hence phenomenology means:
ἀποϕαίνεσθαι τά φαινόμενα – to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself
from itself.”49 However, given this highly formal definition, Heidegger remarks: “But this
expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: ‘To the things themselves!’” 50 Thus,
to make matters clear, Heidegger directly addresses phenomenology, and indeed as the method
of ontology. In this manner, from the previous analyses of ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ, the specific
operation of unconcealment or disclosure [άλήθεια] is expressed as the proper aim of
phenomenology. He thus writes: “Accordingly, the term ‘phenomenology’ differs in meaning
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from such expressions as ‘theology’ and the like…‘Phenomenology’ neither designates the
object of its research nor is it a title that describes their content. The word only tells us something
about the how of the demonstration and the treatment of what this discipline considers.”51
Heidegger thus brings these matters to bear on the essential aim of Sein und Zeit, as
phenomenology takes its charge from beings themselves, with the task of explicating their being
as the method of ontology. As Heidegger writes: “What is it that phenomenology is to ‘let be
seen?’…Manifestly it is something that does not show itself initially and for the most part,
something that is concealed [verborgen].”52 He continues: “But what remains concealed in an
exceptional sense…is not this or that being but rather, as we have shown in our foregoing
observations, the being of beings.”53 It is from these matter that Heidegger emphatically imparts:
“Phenomenology is the way of access to, and the demonstrative matter of determination of, that
which is to become the theme of ontology. Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. The
phenomenological concept of phenomenon, as self-showing, means the being of beings.” 54
Thus, in this manner, the phenomenological method reaches its prime determination by
Heidegger as the method of ontology, that which seeks to disclose beings in their being as they
show themselves. From these considerations, Heidegger thus reaches an essential delimitation of
the task of Sein und Zeit to follow – the phenomenological investigation and interpretation of the
being of Dasein from which the meaning of being in general may be accessed in some
provisional manner. Thus, the primary task to follow these methodological considerations is the
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examination of Dasein in its average everyday mode of being-in-the-world. For as Heidegger
writes: “Because phenomenon in the phenomenological understanding is just what constitutes
being, and furthermore because being is always the being of beings, we must first of all bring
beings themselves forward in the right way if we are to have any prospect of exposing being.” 55
Further in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger expresses this phenomenological disclosure as the
‘letting-be’ [sein lassen] and ‘clearing’ [lichtung] of Dasein itself.56 In this manner, as
phenomena are revealed and thus ‘brought to light’, they are ontologically interpreted in some
fashion. As there being is disclosed through some determinate approach, they are thus ‘let be’
depending on the manner of access, generating the fiat lux that exposes the being of beings
through Dasein. Heidegger here delimits this path from phenomenology to ontology, once more
by explicating the phenomenality of the German word Gang [way] to express the path of access
to being through beings: “The way of encountering being and the structures of being in the mode
of phenomenon must first be wrested [abgewonnen] from the objects of phenomenology. Thus
the point of departure [Ausgang] of the analysis, the access [Zugang] to the phenomenon, and
the passage through [Durchgang] the prevalent coverings must secure their own method.” 57
From these considerations from Sein und Zeit, the development of phenomenology as the method
of ontology has thus been expressed through the essential structure of the Daseinanalytik,
Heidegger’s venture into the being of Dasein and towards being in general. These matters serve
to determine, as Heidegger imparts: “Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, taking
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its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analysis of existence [Existenz], has
fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it arises and
to which it returns.”58
Reduction, Construction, Destruction
In the Summer semester of 1927, immediately following the publication of Sein und Zeit,
Heidegger continues with the essential problematics of the Seinsverständnis of Dasein and the
explication of the meaning of being in general in Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA
24). Indeed, as a somewhat ‘sequel’ to the incomplete Sein und Zeit,59 GA 24 expounds on
Heidegger’s indication to repeat the entire Daseinanalytik along the exposition of the horizon of
time as the guiding phenomena through which being can appear. 60 In this manner, GA 24
contains Heidegger’s address of four traditional ontological theses concerning the nature of being
for the sake of explicating four corresponding ‘basic problems of phenomenology’ through
phenomenological interpretation. However, far from an ‘original science of factical life,’ the
insistence on GA 24 as comprised of the basic problems of phenomenology properly understood
makes it very clear that above all others, being itself is the basic problem of phenomenology and
the phenomena of temporality [Temporalität] as the horizon of possibility for being itself. In this
manner, ontology and phenomenology continue to be at one as phenomenology serves as the
method to an access and thinking of being itself.
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Indeed, just as Heidegger begins in the 1919/20 lecture course, it remains so here in 1927
as he first addresses phenomenology and its position with respect to the lecture as a whole. He
states: “This course sets for itself the task of posing the basic problems of phenomenology,
elaborating them, and proceeding to some extent toward their solution. Phenomenology must
develop its concept out of what it takes as its theme and how it investigates its object.” 61 In this
manner, what is to be discussed is thus not phenomenology as such, but rather the basic problems
that phenomenology attends to. As Heidegger insists: “The point is not to gain some knowledge
about philosophy, but to be able to philosophize.” 62 In this manner, phenomenology is
furthermore not to be understood “as just one philosophical science among others, nor is it the
science preparatory to the rest of them [logic, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion];
rather, the expression ‘phenomenology’ is the name for the method of scientific philosophy in
general.”63 This understanding of scientific philosophy serves to distinguish phenomenology
from the convictions of world-view philosophy as the “wisdom of the world and of life…to
provide a Weltanschauung, a world-view.”64 In this manner, phenomenology thus takes its place
in scientific philosophy as the sole method of ontology – philosophy’s essential realm. As
Heidegger states: “being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy…philosophy is not a science
of beings but of being…ontology.”65
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Following these introductory remarks, Heidegger proceeds to the first division of GA 24
with phenomenological investigations of each thesis in order to explicate the genuine ontological
problems within that will serve as phenomenology’s basic problems. Heidegger thus presents the
four traditional theses as follows: “1. Kant’s thesis: Being is not a real predicate. 2. The thesis of
medieval ontology…essence (Was-sein, essential) [and] existence or extantness (existential,
Vorhandensein). 3. The thesis of modern ontology…the being of nature (res existensa) and the
being of the mind (res cogitans). 4. The thesis of logic…the ‘is.’ The being of the copula.” 66 To
address these matters for the sake of reaching an understanding of the “fundamental question of
the whole science of being…the question of the meaning of being in general…”67 the analysis of
these theses will take its charge from the Seinsverständnis already present in the temporality
[Zeitlichkeit] Dasein that in itself reveals temporality [Temporalität] as the horizon for the
interpretation of being itself. 68 With this in mind, Heidegger makes an advanced indication of
the essential ontological problematics within each thesis that will be explicated as the four basic
problems of phenomenology. The list is as follows: “1. The problem of the ontological difference
(the distinction between being and beings). 2. The problem of the basic articulation of being
(essential, existential). 3. The problem of the possible modifications of being and the unity of its
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manifoldness [as the how and what of modes of the being of beings]. 4. The truth-character of
being [as the disclosedness of truth in the ‘it is’].”69
Following these matters, Heidegger then gives explicit considerations on the method to
be employed in the investigation and explication of these theses towards their basic ontological
problematics. Here, Heidegger begins by remarking that ontology, as the study of the being of
beings towards being itself, finds itself through the Seinsverständnis of Dasein. As Heidegger
writes: “Being is given only if the understanding of being, hence the Dasein, exists.” 70 To grasp
being thusly, however, Heidegger explains once again that it is through phenomenology as the
method of ontology that the understanding of being in the analysis of Dasein is accessed and
worked-upon. To explain this route further, Heidegger thus presents a reformulation of the
phenomenological method as it aims to reach being itself through an encounter with beings. This
three-fold phenomenological method serves to situate phenomenology as the direct path to
ontology.
As Heidegger begins: “Being is to be laid hold of and made our theme. Being is always
being of beings and accordingly it becomes accessible at first only by starting with some being.
Here the phenomenological vision which does the apprehending must indeed direct itself toward
a being….”71 In this manner, the being of a being must be accessed and investigated in a proper
regard in order for being to become thematized as the being of this being, namely, Dasein – in
this way the phenomenological method of ontology receives its characterization. As Heidegger
explains, “Apprehension of being, ontological investigation, always turns…to some being; but
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then, in a precise way, it is led away from that being and led back to its being. We call this basic
component of phenomenological method – the leading back…[from a] being to being –
phenomenological reduction.”72 From this first step in the phenomenological method, an
essential position is reached whereby being itself is rendered accessible as the being of beings in
some provisional manner.
However, as Heidegger states: “Phenomenological reduction as the leading of our vision
from beings to being nevertheless is not the only basic component of phenomenological method;
in fact, it is not even the central component.”73 In this manner, it is thematically necessary that
being itself must be approached in its own right as it itself is the sole aim of phenomenological
ontology. Thus, to reach the second step in the phenomenological method, Heidegger states the
following: “Being does not become accessible like a being. We do not simply find it in front of
us. As is to be shown, it must always be brought to view in a free projection. This projecting of
the antecedently given being upon its being and the structures of its being we call
phenomenological construction.”74 At this stage, being itself is grasped in some provisional way,
and such constructions are indeed related to hermeneutical interpretations. However, neither is
this second stage consummate of phenomenological ontology. As Heidegger writes:
But the method of phenomenology is likewise not exhausted by phenomenological
construction. We have heard that every projection of being occurs in a reductive
recursion from beings…This commencement is obviously always determined by the
factual experience of beings and the range of possibilities of experience that at any time
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are peculiar to factical Dasein, and hence to the historical situation of a philosophical
investigation.75
Indeed, as the concept of history and its affects has been of essential importance to
phenomenology, Heidegger provides further explanation, stating: “The store of basic
philosophical concepts derived from the philosophical tradition is still so influential today that
this effect of tradition can be hardly overestimated. It is for this reason that all philosophical
discussion, even the most radical attempt to begin all over again, is pervaded by traditional
concepts and thus by traditional horizons….”76 Thus, to provide a proper formulation of a
phenomenological construction of being, the third stage of the phenomenological method must
be invoked. As Heidegger states:
It is for this reason that there necessarily belongs to the conceptual interpretation of being
and its structures, that is, to the reductive construction of being, a destruction – a critical
process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must be necessarily employed,
are de-constructed down to the sources from which they are drawn. Only by means of this
destruction can ontology fully assure itself in a phenomenological way of the genuine
character of its concepts.77
Having presented this three-fold determination of the phenomenological method of
ontology, Heidegger thus delimits the process whereby a phenomenological interpretation of the
four ontological theses may be rendered as four basic problems of phenomenology. It is thus
through reduction, construction, and destruction that being itself, the sole theme of philosophy as
phenomenological ontology, may be accessed and the possibility of ontological knowledge may
be attained through Dasein’s essential Seinsverständnis.78 As Heidegger states in closing on
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these methodological remarks: “The method of ontology thus delineated makes it possible to
characterize the idea of phenomenology distinctively as the scientific procedure of philosophy.
We therewith gain the possibility of defining the concept of philosophy more concretely. Thus
our considerations [on the scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology] lead
back again to the starting point of the course.” 79
Interpretations of Kant
In the 1927/28 Winter semester lecture Phenomenologische Interpretationen von Kants
Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA 25) directly follows the critical ontological problematic of the
Seinsverständnis expressed in GA 24 through a reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Here,
through phenomenological interpretation, Heidegger explicates the essential problematic of the
possibility of ontological knowledge in Kant’s work, expressed through the possibility of
synthetic judgement and a priori intuition essential for a grounding of pure reason and thus
philosophy itself. In this manner, through such pursuit of the possibility of the Seinsverständnis
in phenomenological interpretations of Kant, Heidegger discovers a new essential ontological
problematic – the possibility of the ‘knowing comportment’ as the transcendence of Dasein. In
this manner GA 25 serves as an essential stage of development for phenomenology as the
method of ontology. Here, what is first readily apparent is the operation of phenomenological
interpretation. As it has been employed many times by Heidegger before, what is decisive in this
operation is the interpretation of a text as the expression of a particular ground of experience
through which phenomenology can investigate to grasp essential concepts and basic problems. 80
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Thus, as Heidegger expresses at the outset of GA 25, the task of the lecture will be indeed “to
understand Kant properly [which] means to understand him better than he understood himself.” 81
In this manner, it is from a close reading of the Critique that the essential problematic of
Kant’s thinking is to be extracted, as Heidegger relates it to be the possibility of ontological
knowledge through the problem of a priori intuition. Thus, what is at stake for phenomenological
interpretation is as Heidegger states: “of bringing the observations made so far to focus on the
fundamental problems….”82 Indeed, this task of phenomenological interpretation is thus of
critical ontological importance, for through the interpretations of Kant, the Seinsverständnis and
transcendence of Dasein become understood as expressed in the Critique. Thus, through
investigation and interpretation of synthetic judgement, the a priori, intuition and thinking, and
appearance,83 Heidegger reaches an essential determination of Kant’s “radical grounding of the
possibility of ontological knowledge”84 essential for the growing task of a pure Seinsverständnis.
As Heidegger states at the beginning of GA 25, the guiding understanding of the
phenomenological interpretation of Kant takes as it first theme an understanding of metaphysics
and of metaphysics as philosophy. Thus, he begins by addressing the word itself: “Literally the
word metaphysics -– means that which comes after that which deals with φύσις or nature, the
world in general, and being.”85 Indeed, as Heidegger continues, such meaning originates from its
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place in the works of Aristotle, referring to the treatises following the Physics. Thus,
metaphysics receives further signification from the content of these treatises, as Heidegger states:
People saw that these treatises dealt with the problem of the world as a whole and in a
comprehensive sense…an inquiry which Aristotle designates as theology. On the other
hand, there were essays which took as object of inquiry the totality of beings as such
insofar as they are beings; and this discipline, which inquires into beings as beings and
questions the meaning of the being of beings, was called πρότη φιλοσοφία, i.e., first
philosophy.86
Here, as Heidegger makes explicit, from the outset of the course, metaphysics and philosophy, as
ontology, are at one. Thus, as Heidegger explains, this is the essential meaning of general
metaphysics: “We already heard that in the collection of Aristotelian treatises called ‘μετά τά
φυσικά’ there were essays which dealt with beings as beings, with ὄν ἡ ὄν or ens inquantum
ens…The metaphysical discipline which deals with being in general…is called general
metaphysics or metaphysica generalis.”87
Heidegger then relates this essential meaning of metaphysics to its position in Kant’s
thinking, where what is at stake is indeed ‘transcendence.’ As he explains from its meaning in
Aristotle: “The essays ‘transcend’ unto something which lies beyond ‘physics;’ and the meaning
of the μετά in the technical title of ‘metaphysics’ gets transformed. It no longer means post –
following sequentially – but means trans: transcending what is considered in ‘physics’ and its
manner of treating the problematic. Metaphysics is thus the science of the super-sensible.” 88
However, as Heidegger endeavors through the essential project of the course to better formulate
metaphysics it guides an understanding of ontological knowledge, it is thus this understanding of
Metaphysics by Kant that must be held suspect. As Heidegger explains: “Kant does not deny the
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possibility of metaphysics, but holds on to traditional metaphysics in its ultimate goal as genuine
metaphysics. The only question is: Whither and how are we to attempt this crossing over to the
super-sensible?”89
Indeed, for Heidegger, this is the essential question of the possibility of ontological
knowledge itself. In this manner, to retrieve a genuine understanding of metaphysics and thus of
ontology, the second critical element at-stake for the project of GA 25 arises. Thus, as Heidegger
proceeds to delimit the path to understanding Kant’s Critique and thereby philosophy, as
metaphysics, through phenomenological interpretations of knowledge as the being of science, the
essential comportment of Dasein towards entities becomes a thematic endeavor as it reveals the
transcendence of Dasein. Thus, as Heidegger writes:
We begin our observation with a preliminary designation of science as a kind of
knowing. But we do not mean knowing in the sense of the known, but rather as knowing
comportment. This comportment is not a so-called psychic process in the interior of a socalled soul. Rather, as human comportment it is a definite, possible way for humans to
be. To inhere in this way of being and of knowing means to have a relationship with
beings that are knowable or known…This way of being relates to beings themselves; in
fact, it is a comportment which reveals the being to which it is related. 90
To bring these matters to bear with their essential significance in the Daseinanalytik, and indeed
for the future reference to Kant’s Critique, Heidegger thus expresses this knowing comportment
in the following way:
The revealing comportment toward beings which occasionally surrounds human Dasein
is a free possibility of this Dasein. Generally we give the name existence [Existenz] to the
way of being which is peculiar to human Dasein and to which moreover knowing belongs
as a free possibility. Humans exist, whereas things in nature are extant [vorhanden].
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Accordingly we conceive knowing as a free possibility of human existence
[menschlichen Existenz].91
Before proceeding towards these essential problematics explicated through
phenomenological interpretations of Kant, Heidegger first presents a few methodological
remarks. Here, Heidegger directly indicates the essential character of the Critique, and indeed as
one of phenomenological standing. He states: “It is important ‘to see what reason produces
entirely out of itself,’92 which cannot conceal itself but will be brought to light by reason
itself…If pure reason is to become an object to itself, i.e., to attain self-knowledge, then the
manner of investigation itself is pure a priori knowledge.”93 Thus, Heidegger illuminates the
critical phenomenological nature of Kant’s operation in the Critique as an essential task of selfknowing. As he states: “In its basic posture the method of the Critique is what we, since Husserl,
understand, carry out, and learn to ground more radically as phenomenological method. That is
why a phenomenological interpretation of the Critique is the only interpretation that fits Kant’s
own intentions, even as these intentions are not clearly spelled out by him.” 94 Following these
considerations, Heidegger further remarks on the nature of the phenomenological interpretation
to follow. Here, as Kant’s task in the Critique is the grounding of pure reason, and indeed of
philosophy itself understood as metaphysics, Heidegger states: “The main task of our
phenomenological interpretation consists in rendering this foundation visible and in determining
it positively.”95 This, in contrast with the many misunderstandings and misinterpretations of
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Kant’s transcendental aesthetic and logic, this task must be the sole guidance of a genuine
understanding of the Critique itself and indeed if it is to serve as the further ground to explicate
the Seinsverständnis.96
Further on in the lecture, Heidegger presents a precise indication on these essential
misunderstanding of Kant, namely that such a radical attempt to ground philosophy via pure
reason has been taken by the philosophical tradition as the positing of a worldview
[Weltanschauung] rather than an attempt to ground philosophy itself in pure reason. As
Heidegger writes: “Nowadays one is easily inclined to attribute to Kant’s Weltanschauung…this
predominant superiority of the mind over the body. Such a Weltanschauung exists in every
scientific philosophy – in Plato and Aristotle as well as Hegel - and it would be a wretched dunce
of a philosopher who would not share such a Weltanschauung.”97 He continues:
However, we are not concerned with a Weltanschauung but with a fundamental
methodological question which decides the possibility of philosophy in general, namely
whether it is possible to ground philosophy as such by laying out the foundation of the
problematic in sensibility. Philosophy is the conceptual knowledge of a fundamental
realm of phenomena – indeed a conceptual knowledge which must necessarily be
grounded in and guided by a self-knowledge of human Dasein. 98
In this manner, as Heidegger writes, “The problem which Kant poses will be brought to light
only by coming philosophically to terms with him…according to his own challenge.” 99 Thus, in
this way, it is through phenomenological interpretation that a genuine understanding of Kant’s
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aims in the Critique will be achieved, further still as Heidegger states: “We are for Kant against
Kantianism.”100 Indeed, as Heidegger imparts in the end of GA 25:
When some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were,
against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant
became for me a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my
research…In Kant as in no other thinker one has the immediate certainty that he does not
cheat. And the most monstrous danger in philosophy consists in cheating…But where the
greatest danger of cheating is, there is also the ultimate possibility for the genuineness of
thinking and questioning. The meaning of doing philosophy consists in awakening the
need for this genuiness and in keeping it awake. 101
Metaphysics
Following this, in the Spring of 1929 Heidegger delivered Was ist Metaphysik? (GA 9) as
an inaugural address for his instatement as professor at Freiburg University upon Husserl’s
retirement. Here, the aim of the lecture address concerns a deeper understanding of metaphysics,
following the interpretations of Kant, one that through phenomenology presents the essential
concept for the possibility of all ontology – the nothing [das Nichts].102 Here, phenomenology
appears as the direct method of metaphysics, ontology, in what Heidegger calls the unfolding
[Entfaltung] of the nothing. In this manner, Heidegger presents what is to be understood as a
phenomenological description and thus an ontological determination as he addresses the
nihilating character of the nothing. Thus, through metaphysics understood as μετά τά φυσιχά, the
transcendent study ‘beyond beings’ and thus to being itself, ontology is grasped in its pure
possibility through the presentation of the nothing. Heidegger thus further approaches the idea of
metaphysics as a pure ontology, invoking phenomenology as its essential methodological
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disclosure. These matters serve to situate Heidegger’s thinking towards the pure thinking of
being through metaphysics which must be recovered through an address of the history of the
thinking of being. Thus, following the final presentation of the development of phenomenology
in this chapter, the way will be prepared in a proper manner for the next stage in Heidegger’s
phenomenological thinking of the history of being through metaphysics.
Heidegger begins GA 9 by introducing the essential task of the lecture, an understanding
of metaphysics: “‘What is metaphysics?’…This question we will forego. Instead we will take up
a particular metaphysical question. In this way it seems we will let ourselves be transposed
directly into metaphysics. Only in this way will we provide metaphysics the proper occasion to
introduce itself.”103 Thus, to guide the lecture towards a self-imposed understanding of
metaphysics, Heidegger provides a traditional metaphysical question, “Why are there beings at
all, and why not far rather Nothing?”104 It will thus be this metaphysical thinking of the nothing
that will serve to ground an understanding of metaphysics, and indeed as the very possibility of
the being of beings itself. Here, Heidegger’s tact in handling philosophical matters has indeed
reached a critical stage in his phenomenological thinking. As expressed previously through
disclosure and the proper approach to beings, what is here decisive is letting metaphysics ‘showitself,’ indeed, to manifest phenomenologically in its own way.
Proceeding in this manner, Heidegger thus presents several key remarks that will guide
the self-introduction of metaphysics. He begins by providing the following critical
determinations which highlight the priority of the nothing in all scientific research: “That to
which the relation to the world refers are beings themselves – and nothing besides. That from
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which every stance takes its guidance are beings themselves – and nothing further. That with
which the scientific confrontation in the irruption occurs are beings themselves – and beyond
that, nothing.”105 These considerations serve Heidegger’s task of a proper formulation of the
question itself so that the nothing can appear by its own right and thus provide its own
understanding of metaphysics.106 Heidegger then considers a provisional understanding of the
nothing as the ‘not’ [nicht] of logical negation. From these considerations, Heidegger then brings
this ‘common nothing’ into a more precise understanding, as he explicates it essential ontological
foundation. It is from these considerations that Heidegger ultimately states: “The nothing is the
complete negation of the totality of beings.” 107 In this manner, Heidegger thus draws a relation
between the nothing and beings that is essential to its self-unfolding.
As the nothing is here understood as the negation of beings, Heidegger delves further into
the position of Dasein with respect to beings as whole. Here he states: “The totality of beings
must be given in advance so as to be able to fall prey straightaway to negation – in which the
nothing itself would then be manifest.” 108 In response to this, Heidegger states: “As surely as we
can never comprehend absolutely the whole of beings in themselves we certainly do find
ourselves stationed in the midst of beings that are unveiled somehow as a whole.” 109 In this
manner, Heidegger then seeks to locate a sense of the nothing in Dasein’s attunement
[Befindlichkeit] from this essential relatedness to beings.110 Here, he states: “Does such an
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attunement, in which man is brought before the nothing itself, occur in human existence? It can
and does occur, although rarely enough and only for a moment in the fundamental mood of
anxiety.”111 Pursuing this matter further, Heidegger then presents Dasein’s encounter with the
nothing as it is found in anxiety [die Angst]. Here, the meaning of anxiety is first distinguished
from “the quite common anxiousness, ultimately reducible to fearfulness….” 112 Rather it is
through anxiety as a fundamental uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit] in Dasein that the nothing is
encountered. As Heidegger states:
In anxiety we say, ‘one feels uncanny.’ What is ‘it’ that makes ‘one’ feel uncanny?...All
things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere
disappearance. Rather, in their very receding, things turn towards us. The receding of
beings as a whole, closing in on us in anxiety, oppresses us. We can get no hold on
things. In the slipping away of beings only this ‘no hold on things’ comes over us and
remains.113
Thus, from this Heidegger ultimately states: “Anxiety makes manifest the nothing.” 114 To
explain this further, he states: “This implies that we ourselves – we humans who are in being – in
the midst of beings slip away from ourselves. At bottom therefore it is not as though ‘you’ or ‘I’
feel uncanny; rather it is this way for some ‘one.’ In the altogether unsettling experience of this
hovering where there is nothing to hold on to, pure Da-sein is all that is still there.” 115 From these
determinations which source anxiety as the site of appearance of the nothing, Heidegger then
states that it is necessary to interrogate Dasein’s attunement to the nothing in anxiety from which
an understanding of the nothing can appear. Here, as Heidegger begins: “In anxiety beings as a
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whole become superfluous.”116 To pursue this matter further, Heidegger then provides an
analysis of the essential nihilating character of the nothing through annihilation and repulsion.
Here, he states:
In anxiety there occurs a shrinking back before…that is surely not any sort of flight but
rather a kind of entranced calm. This ‘back before’ takes its departure from the nothing.
The nothing itself does not attract; it is essentially repelling. But this repulsion is itself as
such a parting gesture toward beings that are submerged as a whole. This wholly
repelling gesture…which is the action of the nothing that closes in on Dasein in anxiety,
is the essence of the nothing: nihilation.117
Indeed, it is from this point that Heidegger emphatically states: “The nothing itself nihilates.” 118
From this essential exposition of the character of the nothing, Heidegger then provides a
response to this essential metaphysical question that concerns the possibility of the being of
beings at all. Here, he states:
The nothing is neither an object nor any being at all. The nothing comes forward neither
for itself nor next to beings, which it would, as it were, adhere. For human Dasein, the
nothing makes possible the manifestness of beings as such. The nothing does not merely
serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential
unfolding as such. In the being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs. 119
Thus, Heidegger returns to the essential task of the lecture itself, an understanding of
metaphysics. He thus states: “Our inquiry concerning the nothing is to bring us face to face with
metaphysics itself. The name ‘metaphysics’ derives from the Greek μετά τά φυσιχά. This
peculiar title was later interpreted as characterizing the question that extends μετά or trans –
‘over’ – beings as such.”120 As explicated from the self-unfolding of the nothing, the meaning of
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metaphysics thus becomes apparent as Heidegger states: “Metaphysics is inquiry beyond or over
beings that aims to recover them as such and as a whole for our grasp. In the question concerning
the nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings, beings as a whole, takes place. It proves
thereby to be a ‘metaphysical’ question.” 121
In this manner, the phenomenon of the nothing thus proves to be the possibility for the
manifestation of beings and for metaphysics, as ontology, as a whole. Indeed, as Heidegger
explains: “Only if science exists on the basis of metaphysics can it ever fulfill in ever-renewed
ways its essential task…Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the
total strangeness of beings overwhelm us.” 122 It is thus in this manner that the essential
metaphysical question ‘Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing?’ manifests
metaphysics as a philosophical endeavor. As Heidegger states: “The question of the nothing puts
us, the questioners, ourselves in question. It is a metaphysical question.” 123 As Heidegger
explains: “As long as human beings exist, philosophizing of some sort occurs. Philosophy – what
we call philosophy – is the getting under way of metaphysics, in which it comes to itself and to
its explicit tasks. Philosophy gets under way only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence
into the fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole.” 124
From these consideration on metaphysics, Heidegger thus reaches a critical development
of phenomenology as the method of ontology through the self-unfolding of the nothing. In this
manner, as phenomenology overall serves as a way of doing philosophy, Heidegger thus
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indicates its essential character as the path to the self-manifestation of the phenomenon of the
nothing, and as that which brings forward being as such, allows philosophy to address being in
its pure possibility. From this chapter, it has been made clear how phenomenology provides a
method of ontology, a way of access to being itself, first through the interrogation of the being of
Dasein and the access of its Seinsverständnis, which in turn leads towards phenomenological
disclosure of the being of beings. It is through this thinking of Dasein that phenomenology
further serves as the way to a study of being in the possibility of pure ontological knowledge and
the pure possibility of being itself through the transcendence of Dasein brought forth through the
thinking of the nothing and its phenomenological unfolding.
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Conclusion
As I have made apparent through the presentation of this research, it is quite clear how
the phenomenological method is understood, employed, and indeed self-informing of
Heidegger’s philosophical career from 1919-1929. Expressed through Chapter 1, Heidegger thus
begins with the hermeneutics of facticity – the thinking of life itself in its immediacy – where the
phenomenological method is largely characterized by stages of description, destruction, and
interpretation that provide a critical philosophical insight into life experience to allow the
structures of life, facticity, and Dasein to reveal themselves. During this time, Heidegger
continues to rethink how philosophy approaches its content, human existence, and its proper
mode of access to it through phenomenology, bringing the being of Dasein and being itself closer
into thematic view.
It is thus upon reaching 1927, as expressed through Chapter 2, that the progression of
phenomenology towards its ontological import becomes a paramount task for Heidegger, and
indeed the method of phenomenology becomes oriented towards this task. In this manner,
description, reduction, construction, and destruction are each reoriented in their goal, but remain
interconnected the same in operation, as Heidegger seeks to approach beings in a significant
encounter whereby their being is made manifest. And, as possibility stands higher than actuality,
it is for the thinking of being in its pure possibility that Heidegger reaches a greater
understanding of ontology through metaphysics and the phenomenology of the nothing, where
phenomenology can begin to allow for the thinking of being itself to manifest. Indeed, as
Heidegger attributes to the understanding of being within Dasein, this meta-ontology is only at
all made possible as it emerges from human being itself.
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I have thus been able to characterize the critical stages of the phenomenological method
for Heidegger in its development throughout this period of 1919-1929. In this manner, though
the core aspects of description, interpretation, reduction, construction, and destruction are present
at the very beginning, they each receive specific attention as Heidegger moves through different
stages of his early career in search of the facticity of life, the being of human being, and being
itself in its pure possibility. Further, the role of phenomenological destruction and interpretation
to Heidegger’s approach persists with an amazing consistency, as these are not only aspects of
the overall method explored through various works, but remain his very approach to thinking in
general. I have made this altogether apparent, in what sense Heidegger employs the
phenomenological destruction as he begins many of his projects by addressing and critiquing the
tradition of philosophy so that phenomenology can start afresh. Indeed, he also approaches each
philosopher from the history of philosophy as one whose expressions and thoughts lend
themselves to the original and core problematic of philosophy – human existence as the ground
of all thinking – rendered visible through the decisive exposition of phenomenological
interpretation.
Though my task in this project has been restricted to the first decade of Heidegger’s
work, it becomes altogether clear from my demonstrations herein that phenomenology, and
specifically the phenomenological thinking of being itself, continues on to characterize
Heidegger’s thought into the thirties and indeed until the end of his life. In this manner,
following 1929, Heidegger immediately progresses from the thinking of being through
metaphysics to a retrieval of being from its concealment in the tradition of philosophy. Here,
Heidegger looks to Hölderlin for insights on the history of being and its phenomenality as
expressed through Ereignis, or the event. He challenges Nietzsche against his own thought over
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four immense volumes. He revives an ancient understanding of being through interpretations of
Parmenides. Thus, through phenomenology, Heidegger achieves every possibility for the
thinking of being, and indeed as possibility. It is thus entirely clear in what sense the task of this
project may continue to track the development of phenomenology through the history of being
and the thinking of Ereignis in the eras of Heidegger’s thought following 1929. However, what
remains here will have to suffice until any more can be written – “The form by which this silence
may alone be broken is real, strenuous work ‘on the things themselves’ [an den Sachen].”125
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